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Nongovernmental  organizations provide development projects
with motivation, education, and organization. They should be
involved earlier in project development. Successful operations
depend on well-designed linkages between NGOs and govern-
ment.
The Policy. Planning. and Research Complex  distnbutes PPR Working Papers  to disserninate the findings of work in progress ind to
encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and aDl  others interested in de6  elopment issues. These papers carry the na  tcs of
the authors  rtflect  only their views, and sLould be used and cited accordingly.  T'he findings,  interprctations, and cortL_  -i ins arm  the
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Public Sector Management
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The report reviews 24 of 202 Bank projects that  NGOs in each category in Bank-supported
involved nongovernmental organizations  projects.
(NGOs) to identify ways to improve Bank-NGO
collaboration.  The report concludes that Bank staff should
better understand NGOs and their involvement
The Bank has involved NOOs far more in  in operations.  It recommends involving NGOs
implementation (57 percent) than design (11  before implementation, developing creative
percent).  Service providers and intermediaries  financing mechanisms to support them, and
(45 percent) and contractor NGOs (35 perccent)  learning what they 1.  e to teach Bank staff
were involved much more in project work than  about motivation, education, and organization.
the other three types.  NGOs have generally been underused as
The report identifies five functional catego-  partner institutions. In most cases, NGOs
ries of NGO interaction with the Bank along a  brought into project work contributed to project
public-private continuum, based on the varying  success.
degrees to which they represent social (com-
mon) goals or  the public end of the continuum  The challcnge for the Bank is to forge
and economic goals on the private end:  commu-  institutional links between governments and
nity associations, policy advocacy groups,  NGOs that extend and compleiaent government
service providers and intermediaries, contrac-  capabilities. Governments  *nd  NGOs must leIal1
tors, and cooperatives.  to respect each other so they can work toward
such mutual goals as poverty alleviation.
Discussion focuses on the benefits and
difficulties arising from the involvement of
This  paper  is a  product of  the Public Sector Management and  Private Sector
Development Division, Country Economics Department. Copies are available free
from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.  Please contact
Ernestina Madrona, room N9-061, extension 61712 (96 pages with tables).
I  The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Rescarch
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are Icss than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterOAFE0  CONTENTS
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has  been  invaluable  in  bringing  about  a  better  understanding  of  the
operational  implications  of NGO  involvemen;  in  Bank  work.The  objective  of this  paper  is to  draw  lessons  from  a review  of a
number  of  Bank  projects  involving  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  so as
to  assist  Bank staff  by contributing  to  both  policy  and  operations  for  future
NGO-related  work.  The  Bank  is  now  making  more  systematic  efforts  to develop
contacts  and  operational  collaboration  with  NGOs  than  ever  before. This
review  seeks  to learn  from  past experience  so  as to enhance  this  Bank-NGO
collaboration.
The  universe  of 202  readily-identifiable  Bank  projects  involving
NGOs is  presented  by sector,  region,  country,  type  of  NGO  and  form  of
collaboration.  Twenty-four  of these  projects,  representative  of this
universe,  are  studied  in  detail. The  universe  was  based  on  compilations  made
in the  Bank's  NGO  liaison  office  (SPRIE);  the  24  projects  were assessed  in
interviews  with  Bank  staff,  review  of extensive  files,  reference  to outside
documents  and,  in  four  case  studies,  discussions  witlh  NGOs,  beneficiariss  and
government  officials  in  the  field.
This  review  establishes  five  functional  categories  for  NGOs  along
a  public-private  continuum  approximating  the  degree  to  which  they  represent
social  (common  goal)  ends  on the  public  side,  to  economic  ends  on the  private
side. These  categories,  together  with salient  features,  are:v  ii  -
*  community  associations  - represent  the  intended  beneficiaries  more
directly  than  any  other  NGO  type;  involvement  considered  most
helpful  for  project  sustainability.
*  policy  advocacy  groups  - indigenous  or international,  often
focused  on  human  rights  or environment  issues;  involvement  in
project  work includes  contributions  to  planning,  monitoring  and
stimulating  corrections.
*  service-provider/intermediary  - the  best  known  of all  NGO  types,
play  various  roles: they  translate  beneficiary  needs  and
knowledge  of local  condition  to the  Bank  and translate  project
guidelines  to  communities;  organize  beneficiaries  to take
advantage  of project  benefits;  and  provide  service  delivery.
*  contractors  - often  lower  cost  than  for  profit  contractors  but
may, due  to low  capitalization,  be less  prepared  for  certain
financial  responsibilities;  utilization  for  specific  contracting
tasks  may  deter  realization  of other  more social,  innately  NGO
goals.
*  cooperatives  - member  owned  and  operated,  function  much  as private
firms  yet  have equity  goals  regarding  distribution  of profits;
while  attractive  as  economio  entities  that  reach  low  income
persons,  cooperatives  vary  greatly  and  need  to  be viewed  in their
own  context,  particularly  as relates  to  sustainability.- iii  -
The  Bank  has involved  NGOs  far  more  during  implementation  (57%  of
the  universe)  than  design  (11%). Of the  five  functional  categories,  the
service  provider/intermediary  (45%)  and  contractor  (35%)  NGOs  were  generally
more involved  in  project  work than  were  the  other  types.
Conclusions:
(a)  Bank  staff  could  benefit  from  a  more complete  understanding  of
NGOs,  especially  in their  operational  context.
(b)  NGOs  have generally  been  used  for  ends  of borrowing  governments  or
Bank  and  not  as partner  institutions  with their  own  unique
development  purposes. NGOs  brought  into  project  work as  -
independent  entities  made  contributions  leading  to project
success.
(c)  The  major  gap  between  most  NGOs  and  most  developing-country
governments  must  be healed  to assist  sound  lasting  development.
The  challenge  for  the  Bank is  to  convince  governments  that  NGO-
supported  projects  can  extend  government  capabilities  rather  than
compete  with the  public  sector  for  donor  resources  or local  power
bases. Given  the  essential  continuing  role  of the  public  sector
in  development  and  the  distinct,  often  vital,  role  that
non-governmental  development  agencies  also  play,  especially  in
poverty  alleviation  work,  it is  urgent  that  these  two  types  of
institutions  gain  mutual  respect  with  which  to achieve  common
goals.MM=E  PUEBLIC  AND PRIVATE:
A R3V!ZO  O  NON-GOVURNNENTAL  ORGANIZATION  INVOLVEME
IN  WORLD  BANK  PROJECTS
INTRODUCTION
With growing  awareness  of the  limitations  of government  has come
an increasing  recognition  of the  contribution  of  non-governmental
organizations  (NG0s)  to development.  As World  Bank  President  Barber  Conable
observed  in  his  address  to  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  World  Bank  in  Berlin:
Government  policies  and  public  programs  play  a  critical  role  in
poverty  alleviation.  But  governments  cannot  do  everything.  Non-
government  organizations  in  many developing  countries  have
enormous  potential  for  flexible  and  effective  action. I  have
encouraged  Bank  staff  to  initiate  a  broadened  dialogue  with
NGOs...  I  hope  and  fully  expect  that  this  collaboration  will
continue  and  flourish.,
Bank Senior  Vice President  for  Operations,  Moeen  Qureshi,  stressed
the importance  of  Bank-NGO  collaboration  for  "more  effective...  efforts  to
eliminate  mass  poverty"  in  the  keynote  address  to the  1988  annual  conference
of  the  Washington  Chapter  of  the  Society  for  International  Development. 2
Increased  interest  in  NGOs  is  evident  in the  work  of  bilateral  and
multilateral  donors. OECD  has recently  published  Voluntary  Aid  for
.1evelonmen,  a survey  of NGO  activities:  historical  trends,  types  of  NGOs,
'Delivered  September  27,  1988.
2Given  April  22,  1988.-2-
issues  of  central  lnterest,  and  donor-NGO  cooperative  arrangements.'  In  July,
1987,  the  Asian  Development  Bank  approved  a  policy  paper  to  enable  cooperation
with  NGOs.' Independent  research  centers  such as  the  North-South  Institute'
and the  Institute  for  Development  Research"  also  study  the  nature  of NGOs.
NOOs figure  pruinently ln  publications  like  the  recent  World  Development
supplement,  which  was devoted  entirely  to  NWO issues.'
Within  the  Bank,  Michael  Cernea-s  Non-governrental  Organizations
and  Local  Develonm9nt  was  one  of the  firat  publlshed  attempts  to deal
systematicall;  with  NGOo as  development  institutions.  His recognition  that
Wthe  essence  of the  NGO approach  is  not to induce  development  financially,  but
to  mobilize  people  into  organized  structures  of  voluntary  group  action  for
self-reliance  and self-development,"'  contributed  to subsequent  Bank  efforts
to develop  effective  partnerships  with  NGOs.
'OECD,  Voluntary  Aid for  Development:  the  Role  of  Non-Governmental
Drganizations,  Paris,  1988.
*OECD,  p. 100.
'Tim  Brodhead,  Brent  Herbert-Copley,  Anne-Marie  Lambert,  Bridges  of  Hooe?
Canada  Voluntar Agencies  in  the  Third  World,  Ottawa,  Canada: The  North-
South  Institute:  1988.
6L.  David  Brown  and  David  C. Korten,  The  Role  of  Voluntary  Organizations
in  Develooment,  Boston,  MA:  IDR,  1989.
7Anne  Gordon  Drabek,  Editor,  World  Development,  Autumn  1987.
'Michael  Cernea,  Non-governmental  Organizations  and  Local  Develonment,
(World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  No.  40),  Washington,  D. C.:  April  1988,  p.7.- 3 -
In  August  1989,  the  Bank  Lsued an  Operational  Directive  14.70  on
collaboratian  wLth  NGOs.  The  purpose  of this  statement  is  to set  out  a
franevork  for  lnvolving  NGOs in  Bank-supportcd  projects. The  Directlve
deflnes  NGOs  as  belng  entirely  or largely  lndependent  of government,  and
characterlzed  primarlly  by humanitarian  or cooperatlve  rathor  than  commercial
objectLves"  (p.1). After  listing  advantages  and  constralnts  of  worklng  with
NGOs,  the  Directive  (p.  3) sets  forth  various  types  of collaboration  with  NGOs
organized  primarily  by  phase  of  the  project  cycle,  an follows:
*  analysis  of  development  issues:  Bank  staff  and  governments  can
learn  from  NGO  assessments  of  official  development  programs,
especially  when  NGOs  relate  concerns  of low-income  groups.
(Adviser)
*  DroleCt  identification:  NGO  knowledge  of intended  beneficiaries
and  appropriate  technology  can  be tapped.  (Adviser) Small  NGO
programs  may become  models  for  large-scale  Bank-sponsored
projects.  (Adviser/Designer)
*  oro10ct  desig;  NGOs  may work  as  consultants  to  the  Baznk-financed
project  during  planning  stages.  (Adviser/Designer)
*  iwroject  financing:  NGOs  may  co-finance  a  project,  or  activities
complementary  to the  project.  (Co-financier)
*  nroiect  imolementation:  NGOs  may serve  as  brokers  between
government  and  local  beneficlaries,  organlze  communltles,  make
project-financed  credits  avallable  to  low-lncome  groups,  may  be
contracted  by  the  Borrower  to  implement  a  project  component,  etc.
(Implementor)
*  monitoring  and  evaluation:  As outslde  observers  NGOs  can  often
provide  asslstance  as objective  project  evaluators.  (Evaluator)
The International  Economic  Relations  Divislon  of the  Strategic
Plannlng  and  Review  Department  (SPRIE)  has  primary  responslbillty  for-4-
developing  Bank's  policy  toward  NGOs.  SPRIE  also  serves  as a general  llaison
between  NGOs and  the  Bank  and  as  Bank  Secretariat  to  the  Bank-NGO  Committee.
The Public  Sector  Management  and  Private  Sector  Development  Division  of the
Country  Economics  Department  (CECPS)  .esolved  in  discussions  with SPRIE  to
undertake  this  review  of Bank  project  experiences  with  NGOs  with a  particular
focus  on the  instituitional  perspective. The  objective  is to  ass'st  Bank  staff
by contributing  to the  refinement  of policy  and  the  provision  o;  irational
guidance  for  future  NGO-related  work.
Part  I of  this  review  presents  the  universe  of Bank  projects  with
NGO involvement.  Part  II introduces  a typology  of NGOs  as delineated  along  a
public-privatew  continuum. Part  III  presents  issues  which  arose  from
analysis  of  a  sample  of 24  projects,  with  information  drawn  primarily  from
reviews  of  the  files,  interviews  with  Bank  and  NGO staff,  and  for  the  four
case  studies,  field  visits.  Part  IV  discusses  experiences  with  coordinating
Bank-borrower-NGO  relationships.  Part  V offers  conclusions  and  policy
recommendations.
The definition  of  NGOs  warrants  increased  attention. Bank  staff
did  not express  a  consensus  as to  what  defines  an  NGO. Until  1983,  there  was
no Bank  statement  which  clearly  .'d  comprehensively  defined  NGOs.  A review  of
the  literature  reveals  that  the  majority  of analysts  conclude,  with  Michael
Cernea,  that  'the  term  itself  offers  such  a  broad  umbrella  for  a  kaleidoscopic
collection  of organizations  that  attempts  at simple  definitions  are  quicklyrendered  meaningless."9  While  we concur  with  the  definition  quoted  above  from
the  Bank's  OdIS  on  collaboration  with  NGOs,  we  offer  this  refinement:  NGOs  are
institutions  in  neither  the  puiblic  nor  the  private  sectors  whose  goals  are
primarily  value  rather  than  proflt-driven.
This  definition  parallels  one  line  of  current  thinking  on  NGOs,
which  highlights  the  particular  importance  of  "value-driven"  organizations.
Such  entities  can  be  considered  to  constitute  the  "voluntary  sector"  and
distir.guished  from  both  the  governmental  organizations  which  comprise  the
public  sector  and  the  *profit-driven"  organizations  of  the  'private  sector."
As  explained  by  L.  David  Brown  and  David  C.  Korten:
...  The  voluntary  sector  is at  base  concerned  with  problems  of
achieving  social  and  spiritual  aspirations  of  societies  and  their
members..  The  critical  mechanisms  involved  'in  that  activity  are
shared  values.' 0
This  value  distinction  is  crucial  to  appreciating  the  kind  of  contribution
NGOs  may  make  to  development  work. The  values  of  those  NGOs  of  interest  to
development  need  to  be  consonant  with  bettering  the  opportunities  of  humanity,
particularly  the  poor,  for  self-fulfillment.
This  paper  is  concerned  with  NGOs  that  work  with  the  Bank,  their
roles,  contributions  and  limitations.  The  framework  for  discussion,
9Michael  Cernea,  p.  9.
'OL.  David  Brown  and  David  C.  Korten,  wThe  Role  of  Voluntary
Organizations  in  Development,"  Institute  for  Development  Research,  Draft,
September  27,  1988.formulated  from  a  review  of operational  work,  is  oriented  towards  the  more
pragmatic  issues  associated  with involving  NGOs  in  Bank-sponsored  projects.
I. SURVEY  OF  THE  UNIVERS
This  review  provides  an analytic  overview  of the  202  Bank  projects
involving  NGOs,  classifying  them  by sector,  region,  and form  of collaboration
(see  Table  1).  The  universe  of 202  Bank  projects  involving  NOOs  was taken
from  early  records  of the  Bank-NGO  liaison  office  in SPRIE,  six  progress
reports  of the  Bank-NGO  Committee," 1 and  other  referrals  made to  CECPS  during
research.
Based  on the  known  universe,  Chart  1 indicates  the  annual
variation  in  number  of Bank  projects  involving  NGOs from  1973 to  1988. Of all
(3571)  1BRD  and IDA-supported  projects  funded  during  this  period,  minus
adjustment  loans  (122)12,  5.6  percent  have involved  NGOs. With no discernible
trends,  Bank-NGO  collaboration  seems  to  have  depended  on the  work of
11Established  in  1982,  the  Committee  is composed  of development  NGOs  and
NGO  consortia  from  throughout  the  world,  and  senior  Bank  managers  and  staff
from  the  four  Regional  Offices  and  Policy,  Planning,  and  Research. At its
annual  meetings,  the  Committee  seeks  to  a) encourage  dialogue  between  the
Bank  and  NGOs  on  broad  issues  of development  policy,  b) facilitate  operational
collaboration,  and  c)  promote  cooperation  in  development  education  (from
Meeting  of the  World  Bank-NGO  Committee  and  Recent  Progress  in Bank-NGO
Cooperation,  Paper  for  presentation  to  World  Bank  Board  of Directors,  February
13,  1989,  p.2).
1 2Subtracted  because  NGO  work  with structural  adjustment  lending  has only
just  begun.  Past  Bank-NGO work  has  been  almost  entirely  project-oriented.- 7...
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particularly  motivated  staff,  the  winning  of  an ICB  contract  by an  NGO
consulting  firm,  or personal  connections  between  Bank  and  NGO  staff. However,
the  1988  Progress  Report  on  Bank-NGO  Cooperation  notes  a  trend  of expansion  in
Bank-NGO relations,  as  indicated  by  a  sharp  increase  in  the  number  of
projects  under  preparation  in  which  Bank  staff  see  potential  for  NGO
involvement,  and  the  increasing  quality  of  NGO  involvement  in  some  current
activities.1 3
Discussions  held  with  over  50 Bank  professional  staff  in the
course  of  this  review  have  revealed  a  degree  of  imprecision  in  this  universe.
Many  projects  which  had  been  recorded  by  the  former  (pre-reorganization)  Bank
NGO  liaison  office  as involving  NGOs  had,  in  fact,  only  peripheral  association
with  NGOs.  Other  projects  which  had  significant  involvement  were  not  reported
to  any  central  office.  There  was  no  assertion  in  the  Bank-NGO liaison  office
of  completeness.  Nor  was  there  any  requirement  for  Bank  project  officers  that
these  collaborative  efforts  be centrally  reported. In  addition,  there  has
been  widespread  confusion  on the  part  of  many  Bank staff  as to  what
constitutes  an  NGO.  For  example,  staff  who  considered  community  associations
to  be para-government  bodies,  or contractor  NGOs to  be private,  profit-
generating  firms  would  not  have indicated  their  projects  as  having  NGO
involvement.  The combined  result  of non-systematic  reporting  and the
"lMeeting  of the  World  Bank-NGO  Committee  and  Recent  Progress  in  Bank-
NGO  Cooneration,  Paper  for  presentation  to  World  Bank  Board  of Directors,
February  13,  1989,  pp.  5-19.- 10  -
definitional  problem  has  produced  a unive:se  of  NGO-Bank  collaborative
projects  which  is  useful,  although  only  approximate. 1'
Regional  Distribution
NGOs  have  worked  with the  Bank in  just  over  half  of all  countries
with Bank-sponsored  projects. A breakdown  by country  (Table  2) shows  that
five  countries  held a third  of -these  projects. This  includes  India  (21),
Indonesia  (12),  Zaire  (11),  Kenya  (10),  and  Cameroon  (9). The inclusion  in
this  list  of projects  in  which  NGOs  have involved  themselves  (often  at their
own initiative)  as  policy  advocates  reduces  the  number  of  projects  with formal
contractual  agreements  between  borrower  and  NGO.  For  example,  at least  two  of
the  projects  in India  (Narmada/Sardar  Sarovar  and  Singrauli  Power)  and  one  of
those  in Indonesia  (Transmigration)  attracted  critical  international  attention
generated  by advocacy  NGOs.  Since  these  NGOs  ultimately  made  an impact  on
project  implementation,  and  since  informal  Bank-NGO  dialogue  on the  projects
continues,  such  projects  are  said  to  have  NGO involvement.
Sectoral  Distribution
Nearly  half of the  202  projects  reviewed  were  in the  agricultural
sector. Further  analysis  revealed  that  NGOs  work to  design  and  implement
14SPRIE  is  developing  a database  on Bank  projects  involving  NGOs  and  the
NGOs  with  which  the  Bank  has  had  dealings. It is  expected  that  this  will  help
in systemizing  and  monitoring  NGO involvement  in  Bank  projects.TAME 2
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low-cost  credit  schemes  in over  30 rural  development  projects;  more than  35
NGOs  plan and  implement  training  programs  for  extension  workers,  managers,  and
farmers;  some  21  organizations  work  with the  Bank  to strengthen  agricultural
and  iivestock  cooperatives;  and  eight  NGOs  assist  with the  construction  and
management  of irrigation  systems;
Many of the  projects  in  the  Infrastructure/Urban  Development
sector  involve  the  construction  of  homes  or community  facilities.  NG0s
prepare  sites  and  services,  organize  credit  schemes  to enable  individuals  to
borrow  money  for  homes,  build  schools  and  health  centers,  and  train  community
members  in  construction,  maintenance,  and  community  management. In 16 of the
infrastructure  projects  ORT (World  Organizat'on  for  Rehabilitation  through
Training)  consultants  worked  with government  to improve  the  construction  and
maintenance  of transportation  systems.
Several  of the  Population/Health  projects,  such  as the  Kenya
Second  Population  Project,  pioneered  introducing  preventive  health  measures,
family  planning  information  and  education  to the  population  via indigenous  and
grassroots  NGOs.
In the  Industry/Energy  sector,  local  and international  NGOs  have
helped  small-and  medium-scale  entrepreneurs  by making  credit  accessible  and  by
training  businesses  in  management/marketing  techniques  in  14  projects. In
several  of the  power  projects,  the  Washington-based  NRECA  (National  Rural
Electrification  Cooperative  Association)  assisted  in  developing  urban  and
rural  power  systems. In a  very  different  type  of  NGO involvement,  policy- 13 -
advocacy  NGOs  participated  in  some  of the  larger  projects,  including  the
Itaparica  Dam project  in  Brazil  and  the  Narmada  projects  in  India.
In  one  third  of the  20 Education/Training  projects,  NGOs  have
contributed  to  the  planning  and  construction  of schools  and  centers  for  adult
education.  In  the  other  projects,  NGOs worked  with  training  components:
developing  teaching  skills,  improving  curriculum,  and  organizing  literacy  and
skills  courses  for  adults.
Only  three  projects  involve  NGOs in  the  administration  of
Relief/Compensation  and  Poverty  Alleviation  programs. These  projects  are
mounted  to  mitigate  suffering  during  a  period  of  structural  adjustments
intended  to  overcome  national  economic  and  financial  crisis.  NGOs have
effectively  reached  the  rural  and  urban  poor,  managing  emergency  nutrition
programs,  employment  generation  programs  and  village  health  projects  among
others. Though  compensation/poverty-relief  programs  of this  type  presently
make  up a small  percentage  of  Bank-NGO  cooperation  overall,  the  role  of the
NGOs in  this  kind  of activity  is increasing.  Both  the  Bank  and  NGOs  have
identified  a  need to  collaborate  on structural  adjustment  lending--not  only  to
alleviate  the  impact  on the  poor,  but  to  help  design  lending  strategies  that
are  more  likely  to  better  conditions  for  the  low-income  strata.
Distribution  by Constituency  and  Proiect  Phase
The  Bank  to  date  has  broken  NGOs down  in  two  ways;  one  by
constituency  and  the  other  by  phase  in  the  project  cycle  (see  Tables  3  and  4).- 14  -
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Categorizing  NOOs  by constituency--international,  indigenous/intermediary,  or
grassroots--is  a generally  accepted  approach:
*  International  NC0s: Organizations  typically  originating  in
&developed countries  with  wide-spread  activities.
*  Indigenous/Intermediary  NGOs:  Groups  organized  at a  national  or
sub-national  .evel,  with  almost  all  activities  centered  in  the
home country.
*  Grassroots  NGOs:  Community  or  village-level,  3ember-run  groups
working  to develop  themselves  politically  and/or  economically.
In addition,  activity  is  classified  by phase  in the  project  cycle.
Though  an overview  yields  a  very  general  summary  of activity,  some  interesting
observations  emerged  from  pairing  participation  by NGO  constituency  with
participation  by phase  in  the  project  cycle.
a)  Of those  NGOs  serving  in  advisory  capacities,  over  three-fourths
are  international  NGOs.  "Advisers'  include  NGOs contracted  by the
borrower  as consultants,  as  when  NRECA  consultants  work  with  power
companies  to improve  rural  electrification  systems.  The  category
also  includes  groups  who  advise  farmers  on cooperative  development
and  market  identification.  Advocacy  NGOs  who  provide  the  Bank
information  are  advisers  though  they  are  not  contracted  by the
borrower  or Bank.
b)  All large-scale  co-financiers  (those  indicated  in  Table  6) are
international  NGOs.  "Co-financiers"  are  those  NGOs  that  commit
by contract  to fund  a specific  percentage  of  project  costs  or  a- 16 -
partlcular  project  component  (e.g.,  trainlng  for  communlty
development  workers  or  heavy  machlnery  for  road  constructlon).  On
a  smaller  scale,  some  projects  require  relatlvely  small  flnancial
or in-kind  contributlons  from  NGOs  recelvlng  grants.
c)  Grassroots  organLzatLons  are  prlmarily  active  ln  the
implementatlon  stages. NImplementationN  covers  a wide  range:
tralnlng,  organlzlng  communlty  health  or  women's  groups,  building
schools,  and  administering  small-scalel  loans.  Grassroots  NGOs
(e.g.,  village  cooperatlves  and  herdsmen's  associations)  may  be
responsible  for  purchasing  veterinary  supplles,  maintaining  an
irrlgation system,  or disseminating  health  information.  In  LAC,
EMENA  and  Asla,  implementation  is  more  often  carrled  out  by
indigenous  and  grassroots  organizations  than  by International
NGOs.  For  example,  in  Asia,  seven  projects  include  one  or  more
international  NGOs in  implementation  while  27  projects  involve
indigenous  and  grassroots  NGOs.  Only  three  grassroots  NGOs  were
found  among  the  universe  of 202  projects  to  be distinctly  active
in  planning.- 17 -
II.  THE  PUBLIC-PRIVATE  CONTINUUM
The  highly  diverse  group  of development-oriented  NGOs  fill  a  void
between  the  public  and  private  sectors,  enabling  people  to  participate  more
fully  in  both.  The  public  sector  is  often  unable  to  effectively  reach  lower-
income  populations,  and  the  formal  private  sector  has little  incentive  to
involve  itself  with those  who  have  no resources.  NGOs  help  bridge  :z.  for
example,  by organizing  coalitions  of disenfranchised  individuals  to Lifluence
the  political  process,  or strengthening  their  capability  to  participate  in the
private  and  public  sectors  by providing  services  in  health,  education,
training,  etc.
The  prevailing  way  to look  at NGOs  has  been  by constituency  or
project  phase. Another  and  potentially  more  useful  perspective  is to  view
NGOs according  to the  function  they  serve  in  development  work. NGOs  are  often
multi-sectoral,  their  activities  span  mote than  one  phase  of the  project  cycle
and  may extend  to influencing  policy  format!on.
No taxonomy  will do  complete  justice  to the  wide  diversity  of
institutions  known  as NGOs. The  authors  see  two  major  means  for
categorization,  one  the  degree  to  which  the  NGOs'  activities  are  included  to
scrve  public  (common  good)  vs.  pri.vate  (market-oriented)  purposes,  and  the
other  the  degree  to  which  the  NGO  is  directed  towards  the  interests  of its  own
membership  vs. oriented  to a constiL.tuency  beyond  itself. The following  chart
places  our  five  functional  NGO  types  &long  two  continua,  public-private  (left- 18 -
to right)  and  inner  vs;  other  directed  (top  to bottom). Literal
interpretation  of this  chart  will  find  fault  in  that  many  NGOs  defy  easy
categorization;  cooperatives  may  be directed  more  for  public  than  private
goals  or community  associations  devoted  more to  what  would  normally  be
considered  private  (vegetable  gardening,  water  provision)  than  public  ends
(representing  community  interests  with  higher  goverment bodies). However,
the  general  placement  of categories  in  this  chart,  is illustrative  of  NGOs
reviewed. It is  offered  as  a suggestive  guide  for  operational  work involving
NGOs.
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1)  Comunitv  Associations:  These  member-run  organizations  provide
information,  assistance  and  leadership  for  local  communities  and  sometimes
help  public  institutions  connect  effectively  with  local  needs.  They  may  also
represent  at  the  local  level  special  interests  such  as  farmers,  small
busLnesses  or  water  users.  Community  associations  are  typically  formed  by
persons  who  recognize  that  pcoling  resources  enables  the  community  to  work  on
its  own  development.
2)  Poliey  Advocac'  Grouna:  At  local,  national,  and  international
levels,  these  groups  are  advocates  for  those  who  are  otherwise  politically  and
economically  ineffective.  Many  emphasize  environmental,  health  and  public
safety  issues.  Policy  advocacy  groups  often  come  into  conflict  with
government  officials  and  often  feed  into  larger  political  processes.  These
kinds  of  NGOs  often  serve  as  catalysts  for  collective  action  among  poor
persons  in  societies  unaccustomed  to  such  behavior.
a)  community  level:  Political  action  at  the  community  level  is  akin
to  that  of  a  political  party.  Driven  by  the  desire  to  correct
actual  (and  perceived)  injustices,  politically  active  community
groups  are  often  anti-government  and  subject  to  frequent
repression.
b)  indig2nZusZintermediarX:  Members  of  these  groups  may  not  be
members  of  the  disenfranchised  communities  themselves.  Unions  and
religious  organizations  are  examples  of  indigenous  NGOs  which
represent  the  powerless  in  fights  for  policy  changes.- 20  -
c)  internatiUna:  International  advocacy  groups  try  to  influence
policy  changes  at national  and  international  levels.  Activities
are  usually  centered  on specific  issues  such  as the  environment,
minority  rights,  women,  and  child  survival.
3)  Sericea  ProvLder/Intermediarv:  These  organizations,  which  can  be
international  or  indigenous,  may  assist  people  to  take  advantage  of
government-sponsored  programs,  or  help  donors/government  to  assess  local
needs.  Through  sharing  values  with  both  beneficiaries  and  government,  the
NGOs  may  educate  to  the  benefit  of  both.  They  may  assume  service-provider
roles,  offering  health  care  or education  where  government  services  do  not
reach. They  also foster  private  sector  development  through  credit
administration  and  management/technical  training  for  small-scale  enterprises
-- here these  are  not  accessible  to low-income  people. While  these  NGOs  may  run
income-generating  enterprises  to  help  support  their  activities,  most are  not-
for-profit.  Motivated  by neither  the  security  and  prestige  incentives  of
government  workers  nor  the  profit  generation  of  prlvate  enterprises,  staff  and
supporters  tend  to  be drawn  to  the  service  provider/intermediary  non-
governmental  organization  by an  altruistic  motivation  to create  an environment
favorable  for  development.
4)  Contractors:  These  NGOs  become  involved  in  Bank-sponsored  projects
as  consultants  to government  agencies  or financial  institutions  working  to
strengthen  institutional  capacity,  or  as  contractors  designated  to  construct
roads,  schools,  and  other  public  works. Though  these  NGOs  often  have- 21 -
activities  other  than  contracting,  many  behave  much  like  private  contractors,
often  competing  with  private  firms.  Usually  there  are  some  differences:  the
NGO  may  be  less  tied  to  bottom-line  profits,  with  income  from  sources  other
than  contracting.  This  flexibility  may  manifest  itself  in  a  willingness  to
adapt  operations  to  changing  circumstences  or  to  experiment  with  different
approaches.  NGO  contractors  often  charge  less  because  of  lower  overhead.
They  may  be  more  effective  than  a  private  firm  in  using  local  labor  and
resources  or  in  involving  the  community  in  planning.  Most  maintain  a  not-
for-profit  status,  though  consultants  are  paid  market,  or  close  to  market,
rates  for  their  services.
5)  C222eratives:  Defined  as  Tvoluntary  organizations  set  up  to
protect  and  generate  economic  benefits  for  their  members, 5 scooperatives  are
formed  when  a  task  cannot  be  aone  on  an  individual  level,  such  as  obtaining
credit.  Cooperatives  distribute  profit  as  dividends  to  members.  They  are
often  run  on  a  one  vote  per  person  principle.  While  many  cooperatives  are,  in
fact,  full-fledged  private  enterprises,  those  with  which  development  donors
are  concerned  are  generally  dependent  for  an  extended  period  on  project-
supplied  concessional  credit,  inputs,  and  management  training.
When  the  universe  is  viewed  through  the  continuum,  the  type  and
extent  of  NGO  involvement  is  easier  to  understand  and  discuss  (see  Tables  5
and  6). For  example,  we  know  that  in  45  percent  of  the  202  projects,  one  or
more  service  provider/intermediary  NGOs played  significant  roles  as
'sMichael  Cernea,  pp.  13-14.- 22  -
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Obrokers"  between  projects  and  beneficiaries.  By looking  at thls  group  of 91
projects,  we can  observe  patterns  in  service  dellvery  capabilities,
relationships  with  government  and  beneficiaries,  etc.,  with more  success  than
if  we were to try  the  same  with  NGOs in  the  limplementorO  category,  which
includes  an even  more  heterogenous  group  of organizations  and  functions.
Similarly,  when  we look  specifically  at the  involvement  of
cooperatives  in  projects,  our  focus  immediately  narrows  from implementorw  to
small,  grassroots  organizations  operating  primarily  in  the  agricultural  sector
in  Africa.  These  numbers  are  more  meaningful  for  framing  issues  discussions
than  calibrating  cross-regional  comparisons:  the  predominance  of  African
agricultural  projects  may be attributable  to the  generally  greater  number  of
such  projects  supported  by IBRD/IDA. It  must  be emphasized  that  we have
counted  projects  in  which  one  or  more  cooperatives  is involved--the  exact
number  (which  ranges  from  45+  in  the  Bolivia  Second  Emergency  Social  Fund  to
5000+  in the  India  Dairy  Development  Project)  was  rarely  available.
The  problems  and  advantages  to  working  with contractor  NGOs  can  be
culled  out  of the  71 projects  involving  one  or more  them. Over  half  of these
are  in infrastructure  or  energy  sector  projects,  probably  because  these  types
of  projects  are  generally  less  in  need  of the  *brokering"  strengths  of service
provider/intermediary  NGOs,  and  more in  need  of technical  expertise. Though
technical  assistance  from  contractor  NGOs is  much  the  same  as  that  from
private  sector  contractors,  experience  shows  that  staff  do need  to  be aware  of
the  differences  (see  Part  III:  Sample  Findings).- 25 -
While  the  Opublic-privatew  continuum  categories  do not  contain
ho,-ogenous  groups,  they  facilitate  a sharper  picture  of  NGO  work  with the
Bank. The sample  of 24  projects  selected  for  in-depth  analysis  can  be grouped
along  the  spectrum,  illustrating  its  utility  (see  Chart  2).16
I1I.  SAXPIZ  FTNDINRG
Twenty  four  projects  were selected  for  intensive  review  roughly  in
numerical  proportion  to the  universe,  with  11  Africa  projects,  6 in  Asia,  5 in
LAC,  and  2 in EMENA  (see  Appendix  A).  Many  of these  were  selected  because
they  were referred  to CECPS  by SPRIE  and  other  Bank  staff  as  projects  with
particularly  interesting  outcomes. The  sample  is  biased  towards  successful
interactions;  more insight  may  be gained  from  analyzing  experiences  where
things  went  well.  The  sample  also  reflects  the  relative  frequency  of NGOs  in
projects  according  to sector  with  agricultural  (10)  and infrastructure/urban
development  (7)  projects  predominating.  The  rest  of the  projects  were
selected  in  a similar  attempt  to  cover  most types  of  Bank-NGO  collaboration.
Of the  24,  4  were  chosen  because  of their  particularly  controversial  natures-
-each  having  contributed  to a  change  in either  Bank  or host-country  policies
on NGOs,  social  or  environmental  matters.
16  Where  a  project  involved  more  than  one  type  of  NGO,  it is listed
under  the  type  which  played  the  more  key  role.11- j j  - 26t--l1
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Projects  were  reviewed  at  the  Bank.  Four  were  also  reviewed  in
the  field  via interviews  with  NGOs,  beneficiaries,  and  government  officials,
as  well as  knowledgeable  Bank  staff  (see  Annex  B for  a summary  of these  case
studies). Given  the  smallness  of the  sample  and  the  diverse  nature  of  NGOs
and  development  projects,  lessons  drawn  from  this  review  can  only  be
inferential  and  suggestive  of  more  generalizable  truths. Finally,  as all  24
projects  were either  completed  or  well  under  way  at the  time  of analysis,  this
is  a retrospective  review.
A.  Community  Associaticng
1T.  31 of the  202  documented  projects  with  NGO involvement  (15%),
one  or more  of the  NGOs is  a community  association.  This small  percentage  may
be a result  of  underreporting,  as community  associations  were  not  at first
included  as  NGOs  by the  former  Bank-NGO  liaison  staff. Of  the  31  projects,  8
were  designed  such  that  community  associations  are  coordinated  by  intermediary
NGOs.  (Issues  pertaining  specifically  to  Bank-intermediary  NGO-government
interactions  will  be discussed  under  Section  C.)  Over  half  of the  31  are in
the  Agricultural  sector,  which  includes  4  community  forestry  projects  and  6
irrigation  schemes  involving  water  users'  associations.  Eight
Population/Health  projects  depend  on  grassroots  NGOs to disseminate  family
planning/health  care  information  and  services.  Within  the  sample  of  24
projects  reviewed  for  this  study,  five  incorporated  community  associations,
often  in conjunction  with  other  types  of  NGOs,  particularly  service-
provider/intermediary  NGOs.- 28 -
_gals  for Commmity  Asooiation  Inolvement  in Prolects
A primary  goal  for  grassroots  NGO involvement  in  a Bank  project  is
sustainability.  As an OED  review  of sustainability  notes,  alignment  of
project  objectives  and  activities  with  local  needs  and  aspirations  appears
necessary  for  project  success. This  points  to community  involvement  and
grassroots  institutional  development  as integral  components  of  project  work,
particularly  during  the  planning  phase,  inasmuch  as  beneficiary  groups  will  be
more inclined  to organize  around  problems  and  opportunities  they  regard  as
important.-
For  example,  the  First  Education  Project  in the  Yemen  Arab
Republic  showed  practically  no effect  at the  local  level  primarily  because it
was  planned  and  implemented  without  assessment  of  rural  community  needs.  8The
second  project  is  successful,  primarily  because  it integrated  the  existing,
country-wide  network  of  Local  Development  Associations  (LDAs),"L  community-
based  NGOs,  into  curriculum  development  for  District  Training  Centers  and
introduced  a Basic  Training  Fund for  LDA-proposed  village  projects.
Beneficiaries  are  satisfied  that  their  needs  are  heard  and  met, there  is
17OED,  'Sustainability  of Projects:  First  Review  of Experience,  World
Bank,  June 14,  1985,  p. 29.
181t  was  virtually  impossible  to  reach  rural  communities  at  all  in  the
immediate  aftermath  of  a  civil  war.
1 IDAs grew  up during  the  civil  war  as communities  sought  to  develop
mutual  use facilities  and infrastructure.  They  are  parallel  to a local
government  structure  but  can in  no way  be considered  agents  of the  national
government.  They are  led  by elected  village  elders  and  financed  from  taxes  on
produce  sales  (later  augmented  by government  contributions  of customs
revenues).- 29  -
continued  government  support,  and  the  increased  sense  of  mutual  help inspired
communities  to  undertake  additional  development  projects. This  Second  Project
has served  as the  model  for  similar  LDA-oriented  Third  and  Fourth  projects  ln
YAR.
The  La  Paz,  Bolivia  urban  upgradlng  project  yielded  similar
results  through  successful  integration  of  neighborhood  associations.  Recent
visits  indicate  that  not  only  are  community  improvements  still  in  place,  but
that  residents  continue  to  upgrade  their  homes  and  facilities.  Their
communities  are  now  considered  part  of  the  city  proper.  The  Zambia  upgrading
project,  in  which  the  Bank  contracted  the  services  of  the  American  Friends
Service  Committee  (AFSC)  as an  intermediary  NGO, provides  further  evidence
that  community  association  participation  in  planning  and implementation
contributes  to long-term  project  goals.  Though  the  'mutual  self-help'  did  not
turn  out  quite  as  planned,  the  transition  was  a smooth  one  and  neighborhoods
continued  to undertake  joint  activities  after  project  completion.
Sustainability  meansa  that  development  activltles  are  not  only
continued,  but  become  self-supporting.  Thus  cost  recovery  is a  high  prlority
objective  for  communlty  association  involvement.  If  public  authorities  can
recover  most  of the  costs  of a social  investment,  they  are  better  able  to
extend  the  same  program  on  a larger  scale. As the  La Paz  project  illustrates,
when  beneficiaries  are  lncorporated  into  project  des,ign  and  implementatlon
through  the  active  involvement  of the  community  association,  many are  willlng
to contribute  to costs. The  resultlng  sense  of ownershlp  stimulates
cooperation  with the  project.  For  example,  as upgrading  began,  beneficiaries- 30 -
entered  into  a contract  to  pay their  share  of CostS  with  non-indexed  pesos.
With  the  onset  of inflation,  which  ranged  from  two  to  five  digits  during  the
project,  HAM-BIRF  (the  project  implementation  unit)  held  meetings  with
beneficiaries  and  renegotiated  their  obligations  to  pay in  US$ equivalent
terms. Beneficiaries  agreed  even though  they  had  no legal  obligation  to do
so.  primarily  because  they  felt  that  the  project  was  benefitting  them,  and
because  HAH-BIRP  tried  to ensure  their  understanding  of the  repayment
conditions.
Thus,  community  associations  of  intended  beneficiaries  have  been
seen  as  instrumental  for  the  mobilization  of  opinion  and  action,  and  as
communication  links  between  community  and  government  which  can  translate  a
project  message  from  one  to  the  other  and  help  see  that  project  commitments,
such  as  cost  recovery,  are  carried  out.
Analysis  of  Interaction
Successful  integration  of  community  associations  rests  on  their
involvement  in  project  planning.  The  survey  of  the  universe  shows  that  very
few  grassroots  NGOs  (includes  both  community  associations  and  cooperatives)
were  active  participants  in  the  planning  phase.  An  oft-mentioned  reason  is
the  fear  that  beneficiary  expectations  may  be  raised  beyond  the  project's
capability  to  deliver.  It  is  also  time-consuming  to  identify  and  consult  local
groups  who  may  be  unaware  of  the  options  and  unable  to  come  quickly  to  a
consensus.  The  La Paz  and  Zambia upgrading  projects  and  the  YAR  education- 31  -
projects,  however,  indicate  that  benefits  to  both  community  and  government
outwaigh  risks  of the  involvement  of grassroots  NGOs  in  planning.
Though  speci 4 ic implementation  procedures  are  best devised  on a
case-by-case  basis,  certain  contractual  and  funding  procedtures  have  proven
successful  with comm=ity associations.  The  community  contract  approach  used
by HAM-BIRP  in  La Paz  is,  for  example,  potentially  replicable.  A contract
delineated  the  one  of three  upgrading  options  the  community  had selected,  the
amount  each  individual  would  owe,  and  the  time  each  would  commit  to  community
projects.  The  community  having  the  greatest  number  of  residents  signing  up
for  the  program  and  paying  an  advance  for  works  to  be  done  earned  priority  on
HAM-BIRF's  list  of  communities  to  be  upgraded.  By  requiring  consensus  and
commitment  before  beginning,  HAM-BIRF  ensured  resident  understanding  of  and
participation  in the  upgrading  process. This  approach  initroduces  peer
pressure  to induce  residents  to adhere  to the  terms  of the  contract. A
community  contract  also  helps  to  convince  utility  companies  to  extend  services
to  target  areas.  When local  political  leaders  promised  free  services  (which
never  came),  whole  communities  withdrew--at  least  temporarily.  Since
agreements  had  been  made  with  communities  and  not  individuals,  the
municipality  was  not  bound  to  honor  contracts  with owners  who  did  not choose
to  withdraw.
The  proposal  mechanism  of the  YAR  education  projects  has  been
particularly  successful.  The  Local  Development  Associations  of  each  village
propose  needed  training  courses  and  identify  villagers  who  may serve  as
instructors  or resource  persons. Proposals  are  reviewed  by District  Councils,- 32  -
who  advise  on  and  monitor  the  DistrLet  Training  Centers  whiLch  provide  support
services  for  courses.  The  LDAs  are  represented  at  all  levels,  includlng  the
National  Board.  Villagers  are  satisfied  that  their  needs  are  being  met
through  thls  process  and  the  government,  at  both  dLstrict  and  national  levels,
has  expressed  continued  enthusiasm.
The  Northeast  Pural  Development  Projects  in  Brazil  have  taken  an
entirely  dlfferent  approach,  which  is ln  many  ways  simllar  to  the  Grassroots
Development  Initiative  ln  Togo. Both  projects  establlsh  a  grant  fundlng  pool
available  to  grassroots  NGOs,  whlch  have  substantial  flexibility  as  to  the
types  of  projects  they  will  undertake.  Though  there  have  been  a  number  of
small  shortcomings  in  both  projects,  two  primary  issues  arose  that  are  cross-
regional  and  cross-sectoral:
*  analvsis  of  institutional  capacity:  Problems  with  pilot  projects
in  Togo  indicated  that  local  NGOs  needed  not  only  project  funds
but  also  funds  and  tralning  for  lnstltutional  strengthenlng.  The
revised  policy  is  to  analyze  NGO  institutional  capaclty  and
provlde  assistance  where  necessary  before  disbursing  project
grants.  In  Brazil,  a  sum  of  $200  million  has  been  earmarked  for
the  Support  to  Small  Rural  Communities  Component,  inltially
scheduled  for  disbursement  within  three  years.  Many  of  the
implementing  agencies,  primarily  Rural  Workers'  Unions  and
Cooperatives,  have  not  had  the  absorptive  capacity  to  effectively
spend  these  funds.  Tralnlng  and  extra  stafflng  have  not  solved
the  problem.  Some  intermediate  NGOs  have  refused  to  collaborate- 33  -
in what  they  sea  as  forcing  funds  on  unprepared  commiunties.
4mong  other  steps  taken  to alleviate  this  pressure,  the  project
has  been  extended  to eight  years. 20
*  identifica&ion  of  lemitimate  NOQs:  Creating  salectiout  criteria
that  both  encourage  legitimate  community  ascociation  initiative
and  discourage  the  formation  of "ghost  NGOs" (i.e..  those  formed
to  use the  benefits  of  NGO  status  for  commercial  or political
purposes,  and  which  do little  work at the  grassroots  level)  has
proven  difficult. For  example,  recent  Bank  observers  in  Northeast
Brazil  noted  that  in  several  cases,  local  government  authorities
had formed NGOs  and  used  funds  to cultivate  patronage. Similar
problems  erupted  in  Togo. NGO  representatives  to the  Bank-NGO
Committee  have expressed  fear  that  rising  official  interest  in
NGOs in  general  will  stimulate  a  proliferation  of these
illegitimate  NGOs.
Context
The identification  of grassroots  NGOs includes  analysis  of the
comparative  strengths  of existing  community  associations  within  their  social,
political,  and  economic  contexts. The  projects  reviewed  for  this  study
illustrate  the  pitfalls  of  not  doing  so.
20Christopher  J. Hennin  and  Miriam  Parel,  'Report  on NGOs  in  Northeast
Brazil,"  World  Bank,  unpublished,  January  1989.- 34 .
In the  Zambia  upgrading  project  of the  Ameriean  Friends  Service
Committee  (AFSC),  the  field  director  helped  with  project  design. The local
government  proposed  implementation  via  Ward  Development  Committees  which  -ere
delineated  without  respect  to traditional  clan  units. The  APSC's  project
officers  chose  instead  to  work through  local  branches  of  UNIP,  the  national
political  party. This  proved  to  be more  workable  because  local  UNIP  units
were  composed  of traditional  village-type  groups  with  villa&e  leaders,  and
UNIP  had  been active  in social  development  projects  when the  government  itself
had shown  llttle  interest.
While  this  arrangement  worked  well for  involving  communities  in
implementation,  its  limitations  became  apparent  when the  time  came  to  enforce
re;ayment.  UNIP leaders  were  unwilling  to  play  such  a  bad guy  role,  and the
WArd  Councillors  were too  uninvolved  for  the  project  unit  to  motivate  them  as
collectors.  Many councillors  campaigned  against  enforcement  in order  to  gain
political  advantage.  As a result  of giving  insufficient  attention  to the  City
Council,  cost  recovery  and  maintenance  were severely  weakened.
The  La  Paz  community  associations  were  thought  to  be
representative  of  all  residents  and  thus  an  effective  vehicle  for  addressing
the  needs  of the  poor.  However,  while  they  were  effertive  as  ntermediaries
between  the  project  and  home  owners,  a  beneficiary  assessment  revealed  that
many  of the  poorer  residents,  the  large  population  of renters  (three  times
that  of the  owners),  had  been entirely  overlooked.  Infrastructural
improvements  -ad  not  been  made available  to  many  renters,  whose  rents  had
increased  anyway  because  of the  growing  desirability  of the  area.  Those- 35  -
renters  who were not  given  access  to  water  supplies  or toilet  facilities
continued  to  use  the  river,  thereby  undermining  efforts  to  improve
sanitation. 23 Identification  of the  community  associations'  positions  vis-a-
vis other  area  residents  can  enable  the  project  to promote  development  with
equity  and  to increase  project  effectiveness.
More  than  the  usual  amount  of  resources  was  devoted  to  assessing
the  existing  community  association  ne work  in the  YAR Education  project.
Designers  found  the  Local  Development  Associations  to  represent  the  interests
of all  members  of a community,  even  though  the  leaders  tended  to  be village
elite.  Designers  also  worked  to ensure  that  institutional  arrangements  would
facilitate  the  WA--government  relationship.
B.  Policv  Advocacy  GrouMs
Only 10  of the  202  projects  have  recorded  the  involvement  of  one
or more  policy  advocacy  groups,  NGOs  that  bring  issues  such  as the  environment
and  rights  of  people  who  are  politically  and  economically  disenfranchised  to
the  attention  of  policy  makers.  However,  since  these  have  been  particularly
controversial  for  the  Bank,  the  sample  of 24 includes  four  of these. In all
four  cases,  the  NGOs  have influenced  changes  in  project  implertintation.  As
watchdogs  of Bank  and  government  planning/enforcement  of environmental,
resettlement,  and  upgrading  policies,  they  have  worked  to focus  international
attention  on actual  and  perceived  injustices.  Many  work  by lobbying  Bank  and
21Lawrence  F. Salmon,  Listen  to the  People,  World  Bank,  Oxford  University
Press,  1987,  p. 81.- 36 -
government  (donor  and  borrower)  officials,  the international  press,  and  their
own  constituencies.  Policy  advocacy  NGOs  have in some  cases  provided  informal
advise  to Bank  on an  ongoing  basis. However,  their  dominant  mode  of activity,
as regards  both Bank  and  borrowing  governments,  may  be better  described  as
confrontational  than  collaborative.
Advantages  of Policy  Advocacv  NGO  Involvement
Interviews  w'th Bank  staff  revealed  three  distinct  advantages:
contributions  to  planning  and  design; watchdog  or monitoring  roles  during
implementation;  and  stimuli  to corrective  action. All three  of these  roles
increased  the  projects'  responsiveness  to the  natural  environment  and  to
people  unable  to defend  themselves  (for  example,  impoverished  groups
threatened  with  resettlement  as  a result  of a  Bank-supported  project).
Many agree  on the  importance  of  bringing  advocacy  NGOs  into
project  design--rather  than  in  the  middle  of implementation,  when input  will
be criticism  of plans  gone  awry.  In the  Itaparica  area  of  Northeast  Brazil,
the  indigenous  rural  workers'  union  (Polo  Sindical)  was extremely  effective  in
representing  the  interests  of  people  to  be resettled  as the  result  of a dam
project. Bank staff  turned  to the  union,  as  well  as to cooperatives,
churches,  and  other  representative  organizations,  to gain  insights  into  the
opinions  of the  affected  population.  As the  union  had  developed  technical
expertise  to supplement  its  political  force,  project  staff  found  union
contributions  to a tochnical  dialogue  quite  useful. Informal  consultations
continued  throughout  appraisal  and  implementation.- 37  -
In the  Tondo  Foreshore  development  project  in  the  Philippines,  an
indigenous  advocacy  organization  forced  its  way into  the  planning  process.
ZOTO (Zone  One  Tondo  Organization)  was a  people's  movement  consisting  of 113
community  organizations  and  supportLi  by neighboring  federations,  Philippine
church  groups,  and  some  international  advocacy  groups. The  Philippine
government  had  tried  repeatedly  since  the  1960's  to replace  the  squatter
settlement  with  an industrial  center,  and  ZOTO  had repeatedly  organized
sufficient  protest  to  delay  these  plans. ZOTO  eventually  also  appealed  to the
World  Bank,  thereby  helping  to influence  a  change  in  project  plans--from
industrial  development  to squatter  upgrading. The  resulting  project  had  a far
more  beneficial  impact  than  would  have  the  initially  planned  mass
resettlement.
Advocacy  NGO intervention  as  watchdog  of  the  implementation
process  has  uncovered  problems  which  may  otherwise  have  gone  undetected  during
supervision  missions. A good  illustration  comes  from  the  Narmada  River
Development/  Sardar-Sarovar  Dam  and  Power  project,  where  local  NGOs  reported
to the  Bank  a  reinterpretationw  of the  land  compensation  agreement  once  it
was  put into  action  at the  local  level. Where  the  record  clearly  stated  that
two  hectares  of land  should  be given  to  each  family,  including  landless  and
encroachers,  the  government  of Gujarat  (or  at least  one  local  official)
interpreted  this  to  mean  two  hectares  to  each  previous  landholding.  This
would  have  given  even  extended  families  with three  adult  sons  and  families  two
hectares  total,  when they  may  have  jointly  worked  fifteen  hectares  before.
Faced  with  an NGO-organized  uprising  and  tension  with  the  Bank,  the  Chief- 38  -
Minister  publicly  apologized  for  the  problem  and  reassured  the  oustees  and
Bank  that  the  government  intended  to  cooperate  in  every  way.
Similarly,  Polo  Sindical  prodded  Brazilian  officials  into  action
in  the  Itaparica  project.  As  the  flooding  date  approached  and  resettlement
plans  had  yet  to  be  enacted,  the  union  orchestrated  a  strike  at  the  dam  site,
bringing  the  project  to  a  standstill  until  demands  were  met.  Though  existing
plans  already  fulfilled  ninety-five  percent  of  the  union's  demands,  the  union
had  not  been  informed  and  was  thus  reacting  to  plans  from  six  months  earlier.
CHESF (the  Brazilian  power  utility  subsidiary  with  implementation
responsibility)  had  withheld  the  revised  plans  to  prevent  them  from  becoming
an  election  year  issue.  The  result  of  the  strike  was  a  contract  between  the
unions  and  CHESF, which  created  an  atmosphere  of  constructive  NGO-government
cooperation  that  greatly  facilitated  implementation.
One  conclusion  that  came  out  of  most  interviews  related  to  these
projects  is  that  advocate  NGOs have  brought  much  useful  information  to  the
Bank,  enabling  project  staff  to  design  projects  with  increased  respect  to
social  and  environmental  concerns.  There  is  consensus  on  the  need  to  involve
these  groups  in  project  planning,  implementation,  and  possibly  evaluation.
Especially  the  indigenous  advocacy  groups  have  shown  themselves  to  be  fairly
reliable  sources  of  information  concerning  1)  beneficiary  concerns,  2)
technical  knowledge  of  local  conditions,  and  3)  the  degree  to  which  national
government  commitments  to  well-planned  resettlement  and  environmental
protection  plans  are  carried  out  by  officials  at  state  and  local  levels.- 39 -
Thus,  while  policy  advocacy  NGOs  may  often  bring  uninvited
criticism  to a  project,  they  may  also  provide  useful  information  and  motivate
borrower  governments  in  ways that  Bank  staff  cannot.
Interaction
While  contributing  to  constructive  adaptations  of project
components,  criticism  from  advocacy  groups  has  also  generated  negative
impressions  of  NGO  activity  within  the  Bank. Though  letters  are  answered  and
NGO  representatives  are  met  regularly,  staff  are  often  put  on the  defensive  by
NGO  materials  that  contain  gross  exaggerations  of  project  problems,  emphasize
negative  project  effects  without  mentioning  project  benefits,  or  place  what is
perceived  as  undue  responsibility  for  problems  on the  Bank. A good  example  of
this  is the  huge  letter  campaign  on the  Itaparica  dam  project. Most  expressed
indignation  that  the  Bank  had  helped  build  the  Itaparica  dam  at  all  in  light
of the  negative  social  and  environmental  impacts;  in fact,  the  Bank  was  not
involved  in  building  the  dam,  but  was sponsoring  a stand-alone  resettlement
and  relief  project.
Such  tactics  leave  Bank  staff  considering  proactive  policies
towards  advocacy  NGOs,  instead  of the  defensive,  reactive  stance  usually
adopted. Some  staff  feel  that  the  Bank  must  develop  an offensive  and  pre-
emptive  public  relations  capacity. For  example,  some  have  suggested  that  the
Bank  should  publicize  its  activities  more through  documentaries,  which
advocacy  NGOs  have  often  used successfully  to  depict  the  Bank in  a negative
light.- 40  -
Bank  staff  are  frustrated  by the  publication  of NGO  materials
which  seem  dogmatic  and  are  written  by people  who  have  not  visited  the  project
and  have little  idea  of the  Bank's  role  vis-a-vis  government  in
implementation.  Indeed,  as a survey  of European  NGO  perceptions  of the  World
Bank indicates,  Bank  operations  are  often  not  well  understood  by NGOs.  From
interviews  with  30 of the  larger  European  NGOs,  Stephanie  Baile  concludes:
For  most  NGOs,  the  World  Bank is  a remote
organization,  far  removed  from  their  day-to-day
activities.  NGOs  are  very  well informed  about  their
national  bilateral  aid  programs  but  largely  ignorant
of  World  Bank  operations.  Moreover,  the  information
that  they  receive  about  the  World  Bank...  is  often
controversial,  partial  and  biased.
Interviews  showed  that  some  NGO  leaders  known  for
having  negative  attitudes  towards  the  World  Bank  had
come  out  with  much  more  balanced  views  on the  Bank
when they  had  had  an opportunity  to engage  in
discussion  with  World  Bank  officials  on the  occasion
of  World  Bank seminars,  symposia,  or  more informal
social  functions.2
Increased  emphasis  on a two-way  information  flow  may  help  Bank-advocacy  NGO
relationships,  with  NGOs  viewing  themselves  as advisers  to the  Bank,  and the
Bank  providing  openings  for  NGO input.
2Stephanie  Baile,  Survey  of Eurolean  Non-Governmental  Aid  Organizations:
A Guide  to NGOs  and  their  Eerception  of the  World  Bank,  World  Bank,  European
Office,  May  1986,  pp.  5-6.- 41 -
Understanding  to  what extent  advocacy  NGOs  represent  the  interests
of  project  beneficiaries  is  possibly  the  most  difficult  aspect  of involving
them  in Bank  projects. It  may  be particularly  difficult  to discern  the  degree
to  which  international  NGOs  represent  the  views  of local  populations,
especially  concerning  environmental  and  tribal  rights  issues. In the
Indonesia  Transmigration  projects,  for  example,  the  reactions  of local  NGOs  to
views  expressed  by international  advocates  indicate  a difference  of opinion.
The  views  of both  were  published  in  1986  and  1987  in  The  Ecologist. Survival
International  (SI)  and  other  international  NGOs  presented  an  open  letter  to
the  Bank  calling  for  it to  suspend  funding  in light  of the  fact  that  the
Transmigration  programs  were  designed  to implement  Indonesian  government
policies  directly  counter  to those  of the  Bank. 23  Indonesian  NGOs  responded
with  a lengthy  letter  to  The  Ecologist  which  stated  that  the  transmigration
programme  is  'more  of  an  ecological  and  natural  resources  mismanagement  issue
than  a colonization  issue'  which  'does  not  necessarily  represent  [a]  grave
threat  to  either  the  environment  or indigenous  peoples."24
23SI  quotes  the  Bank  as  being  committed  to  preserving  the  cultural
identity  and individual  and  collective  rights  of  project-affected  tribals  (OMS
#2.34),  while  the  government  is  quoted  as advocating  active  assimilation  of
Irian  Jayans  into  the  Indonesian  culture  (fPlita,  May 1985;  Indonesia: News
and  Views  VI, 1986,  in  SI letter  to  B. Conable,  January,  1988).
24AProgramme  Slashed  in  Response  to  Transmigration  Campaign,"
Th2  EcologL-M,  Vol.  17,  No. 1, 1987,  p. 41.42  -
Developing-country  governments  are  often  especially  sensitive  to
the  role  of international  advocacy  NGOs. These  groups  use their  influence
with  industrial-country  governments  to  p.At pressure  on  the  Bank  and  on
developing-country  governments.  This is  sometimes  perceived  as an  imposition
on  national  sovereignty.  Moreover,  not  all  international  advocacy  NGOs  are
well-informed  about  local  circumstances.
The situation  is  sometimes  further  complicated  by government-
organized  NGOs (called  "GONGOs"  by some). In  Nadhya  Pradesh,  another  Indian
state  in  which  massive  resettlement  will follow  dam  construction,  the  NGO
network  is  extremely  weak.  One  Bank  staff  member  was invited  to  meet  with  a
group  of Madhya  Pradesh  NGOs  whom,  he assumed,  were representative  of a
budding  community  activist  network. Instead,  he found  many  of them  to  be
"dummy"  NGOs,  sent  by state  officials  to  promote  government  opinions.
The  Bank  is  limited  in  its  ability  to  coordinate  indigenous
advocate  NGOs  and  borrower  governments.  Local  advocacy  groups  ar.a  often
perceived  as  threats  to  governmental  authority. Government  officials  are  not
usually  inclined  to invite  what  may  be  seen  as  opposition  groups  into  the
planning  of government  programs. The  Bank  can  play  a role in improving  this
relationship  by encouraging  forums  for  discussion,  for  example,  and
advocating  NGO representation  on  various  committees:  state-level  union  members
now  sit  on the  national  committee  of  Brazil's  Northeast  Development  project,
and  a local  NGO leader  sits  on the  government's  Land  Purchasing  Committee  in
Gujarat.- 43 -
Bank-advocacy  NGO  relationships  can  be seen  as evolving.  In the
first  stage,  it  was  necessary  for  NGOs  to generate  large-scale  campaigns  in
order  to capture  the  international  attention  necessary  to force  high-level
policy  decisions  within  the  Bank  and  governments.  Their  activities  were
generally  successful:  an Environment  Department  had  been  established  in  the
Policy,  Planning,  and  Research  staff,  and  there  are  now  environment  divisions
in all  four  regional  technical  departments.  In addition,  and  partly  due to
this  reorganization,  greater  attention  is  accorded  to  project  impact  on the
environment,  oustees,  and  indigenous  tribes. In the  second  stage,  however,
once  NGOs  have established  themselves  as forces  to  be reckoned  with,  the
relationship  may  be less  confrontational.  The  Bank  now  seeks  out  the  views  of
environmental  NGOs on  various  policy  and  operational  matters,  and  even  the
most  critical  of environmental  groups  have  given  public  support  to  some  Bank
work.
C.  Service  Providers/Intermediaries
This  group  comprises  91  projects,  45 percent  of the  universe,  and
includes  those  which  deliver  services  to  people  or areas  largely  unreachable
by the  public  and  purely  private  sectors. The  service  delivery  function  is
perceived  by many  Bank  staff  to  be the  non-governmental  sector's  greatest
advantage. The  important  'intermediary  role  assumed  by  many  NGOs is  the
ability  to  act  as  broker  of  values  and  information  between  donor/government
and  beneficiaries,  using  knowledge  of  both local  circumstances  and  project
objectives.- 44  -
In the  agricultural  sector,  NGOs implement  training  (managerial,
agricultural,  vocational)  programs  in  17  projects,  organize  and  lend
managerial  assistance  to cooperatives  in  at least  six,  provide  financial
assistance  to grassroots  organizations  in three,  and  coordinate  community
forestry  activities  in  nine.
Population/Health  is  a sector  to  which  NGOs seem  particularly
well-suited--primarily  because  of their  relative  strengths  vis-a-vis
government  and  private  health  care  to  extend  information  and  services  to less
accessible  populations. They  also  have  been  particularly  good  partners  in
urban  development  projects,  where  community  involvement  is  often  essential  for
success. NGOs  have  encouraged  communities  to  voice  their  opinions  to project
managers  and  have generated  self-help  efforts  to construct  both individual
dwellings  and  common  facilities.
The  Bank/borrower-intermediary  NGO interaction  is  noteworthy  for
pioneering  approaches. Ban's  staff  were  taking  chances  on project  models  not
previously  tested  in  Bank-sponsored  projects. While  this  study  may  draw
attention  to a  number  of problems,  it  also  recognizes  the  benefit  of such
pilot  projects  as a  basis  for  future  projects.
Goals  for Involving  SP/Intermediarv  NGOs  in Proiects
Many of the  NGOs interviewed  resent  being  perceived  merely  as
"service-providers".  Their  goal  is to serve  as an institutional  bridge
between  the  project  and  its  beneficiaries,  linking  project  objectives  and- 45 -
activities  to  the  needs  and  environment  of beneficiaries.  Much  of the
discussion  about  NCO  ties  wlth  large  development  institutions  concerns  a fear
that  NGOs  will  become  too  bureaucratic,  lose  touch  with local  needs  and,
eventually,  with their  original  development  goals. On the  other  hand,  there
is  also  a fear  that  by avoiding  opportunities  to influence  development
activities  initiated  by governments  and  large  development  institutions,  NGOs
will  be unable  to  have  much influence  outside  the  immediate  project
environment.  Reconciliation  of  project  objectives  with  the  NGO's  goals  and
institutional  capabilities,  without  distortion  of the  organization,  is  an
overriding  policy  issue  in Bank-intermediary  NMO  collaboration.
Goals  for  involving  an intermediary  NGO in  a  Bank-sponsored
project  include  the  following:
1.  translate  beneficiary  needs,  knowledge  of local  conditions  to
Bank/borrower:  This function  can  mean  advice  given  in  informal
discussions,  formal  representation  of  NGOs  on  project  planning  or
implementation  teams,  contractual  agreements  to  perform
beneficiary  assessments,  or  other  arrangements.  When rural
populations  were  not  being  effectively  reached  by the  First
Population  Project  in  Kenya,  indigenous  NGOs (National  Council  of
Churches  of  Kenya,  Christian  Health  Association  of  Kenya,  Kenya
Catholic  Secretariat)  were informally  consulted  on  ways to  improve
effectiveness  with the  Second  project. They  have  since  been
formally  incorporated  into  project  dialogue  and  receive  project- 46 -
funding  to  distribute  family  planning  information  and  administer
services.
2.  translate  guidellnes  of project  to communiti.x:  As shown  ln the
Zambia  upgrading  project  example,  lntermediary  NGOs  may  be able  to
translate  the  ldeas  of  project  managers  concerning  community
self-help  a-.d  repayment  plans  to  beneficiaries.  The  Guatemala
Reconstruction  project,  in  which  FENACOAC,  a federation  of 69
savings  and  loan  cooperatives,  took  over  the  small  enterprise,
income-generation  component,  provides  another  example. While
BANVI,  the  national  housing  bank,  was  too  far  removed  from  small
entrepreneurs  to  have  interest  in  or capacity  for  working  with
them,  FENACOAC  was  able  to notify  its  member  cooperatives  of
available  funding  and  assist  them  with  preparing  proposals  to take
advantage  of lt.  The  federation  disbursod  and  collected  100
percent  of  project  funds.
3.  organize  beneficiaries  to take  advantage  of project  beneflts:
Beyond  transferring  lnformation  to  beneficiaries,  intermediary
NGOs  have catalyzed  community  association  and  cooperative
formation.  A good  illustratior.  of this  is  the  work of  TKV
(Development  Foundation  of Turkey)  with  poultry  cooperatives.  TKV
was contracted  to  replicate  its  successful  coopera"'ve  model  on  a
larger  scale  within  the  Fifth  Livestock  Development  project. The
NGO  promotes  the  project  to farmers,  encourages  village  consensus,
trains  professionals  to  provide  technical  asslstance,  provides. 47 -
administrative  services,  and  sets  up  marketing  and  distribution
centers. By organizing  cooperatives  of 20 farmers  and  providing
support  services,  TKV  gives  individuals  access  to  project-funded
credit.
4.  deliver  services  to less  accessible  populations:  Delivering
services  to  people  or areas  unreached  by government  agencies  or
private  firms  is  another  valuable  contribution  of service
provider/intermediary  NGOs. The issue  for  the  Bank  is  how  to take
advantage  of NGO  expertise  without  compromising  NGO  goals  and
modes  of operation. The  Bangladesh  and  Kenya  Population  projects
have  handled  this  with  reasonable  success. In  both cases,  the
guidelines  for  NGO  funding  are  fairly  broad:  as long  as  NGO
programs  contribute  to  national  health/population  objectives,  they
are  free  to  choose  their  own  methods  of operation.
5.  serve  as Intermediaries  to  other  NGOs:  This  typically  takes  the
form  of financial  intermediation,  though  other  functions  include
geographical  coordination,  technical  assistance,  and  training.
Staff  in  some  projects  selected  a  particular  NGO or  NGO  umbrella
organization  to review  proposals  and  disseminate  funds.
FENACOAC,  for  example,  served  as  a channel  to  smaller
cooperatives.  In the  Togo  Grassroots  Development  Initiative,
FONGTO,  an  umbrella  organization,  coordinates  NGO  activities  and
manages  training  programs  for  members  that  require  institutional
strengthening.48 -
A common  denominator  among  these  predominantly  successful  examples
of intermediary  NGO-Bank  collaboration  Is  Bank/borrower  recognition  of the
particular  developmental  objectives  of each  NGO.  FENACOAC,  the  Kenyan  NGOs,
Swarnivar  (Bangladesh  NGO),  and  TKV  participate,  for  the  most  part,  as
organizations  with individual  goals  and  modes  of operation--not  as contractors
concerned  primarily  with fulfilling  Bank/borrower-delineated  terms  of
reference  for  a fee.
Bank  staff  lack  of recognition  of  an NGO's  institutional  agenda
weakened  the  Zambia  upgrading-project.  AFSC  joined  the  project  with the
distinct  objective  of generating  community  participation  in the  planning  and
construction  processes;  indeed,  the  Bank  saw  AFSC's  role  as implementing  the
project's  "community  development'  component. Bank  staff  were skeptical  of the
efficacy  of self-help  construction,  and  the  Lusaka  City  Council  did  not  have
the  capacity  to supervise  large-scale  community  involvement  in  civic  works.
But  pressure  to  build  within  the  disbursement  period  led  Bank  staff  to attach
a rider  to the  final  agreement:  "should  the  procedure  [of  collective  self-
help]  interfere  with the  progress  of timely  execution  of the  Project,  the
government  shall,  in  consultation  with  the  Bank,  employ  contractors  to  carry
out  the  above-mentioned  works.  2 the result  was that  contractors  had to
incorporate  community  residents  as  workers,  an  arrangement  which,  for  a number
of reasons,  was a frustrating  one  to  all  parties  involved. While  still
25Hoek-Smit,  AFSC,  p.73. Text  quoted  from  final  draft  copy  of Letter  No.
2,  18 June  1974,  for  signature  by authorized  representatives  of the  World  Bank
and the  Lusaka  City  Council.- 49 -
reasonably  succeseful,  retrospection  indicates  that  reduced  time  pressure  and
more  flexibility  for  AFSC might  have-increased  the  community  contribution  to
implementation.
Another  Bank-NGO controversy  arose  in  the  El  Salvador  Second  Urban
Development  project;  FUNDASAL  (Salvadorean  Low-Income  Housing  Foundation)  was
asked  to implement  the  entire  project. While  Bank  staff  were  generally
extremely  responsive  to the  special  needs  of an  NG0, 26there  was  an ongoing
controversy  as to  project  objectives  and  how  progress  toward  these  should  be
addressed  in evaluations.  FUNDASAL  saw  housing  as a  means  towards  larger
developmental  goals,  as "laying  the  foundations  for  a process  of social
change." But  the  Bank  wondered,  in the  words  of one  staff  member,  "whether  a
low-cost  construction  project  is  the  most  appropriate  vehicle  to further  these
aims,"  and  expressed  concern  over  the  lack  of dependable  hard  data  in the
cost-benefit  analysis  of mutual  help.  The  final  compromise  was  to  produce  two
separate  evaluations  of mutual  help:  one  by FUNDASAL  for  'national
consumption,"  considered  "inappropriate  to  circulate  within  the  Bank,"  and
another  for  the  Bank  with less  political  content. 27 This  difference  of opinion
between  Bank  staff  and  FUNDASAL,  however,  had  little,  if  any,  effect  on
project  performance  inasmuch  as  FUNDASAL  (unlike  AFSC in  the  Zambia  project)
had  complete  responsibility  for  implementation  of  the  projects'  housing
26A  special  revolving  credit  fund  was set  up to allow  continued  operation
while  waiting  for  expense  reimbursements.  The  repayment  period  for  the  loan
was  extended  to  enable  FUNDASAL  to  complete  projects  and  recoup  losses  caused
by rising  political/economic  instability.
27Memos  from  Project  Files,  1978.- 50  -
component  (the  only  NGO in  Bank  history  to  have  such  extensive  authority  for  a
Bank-financed  projsct).
Interaction
Planning: The  Kenya  Population  project  illustrate  the  efficacy  of
inviting  intermediary  NGOs  lnto  the  planning  process  before  agreeing  on  an
implementation  strategy. Less  tension  and  delay  occur  if  goals  and  the
resources  necessary  to  achieve  them  are  agreed  upon  at the  outset.
Proposal  preparation:  As  George  Baldwin,  a  Bank  consultant,
observes,  donors  are  accustomed  to  an  approach  to  funding  which  requires
recipients  to  prepare  detailed  project  proposals,  often  at  their  own expense,
complete  with  cost  estimates  and  a  two-to-three  year  timetable.r  Where  NGOs
have  had little  interaction  with international  donors  or  have  had  little
experience  with  a particular  type  of  project,  there  may  be cause  to assist  the
NGOs to gain  primary  information  necessary  to  a  well-thought  out  budget  and
implementable  proposal.  For  example,  the  Bank,  with  its  experience  and
exten*-ive  access  to research,  can  channel  to  NGOs  state-of-the-art  information
on a  particular  type  of project,  advise  NGO  planners  as to contingencies,  and
explain  clearly  the  details  of financing  in Bank-sponsored  projects.
Institution--building:  Projects  involving  a single  intermediary
NGO  as implementor  may require  such  assistance  before  the  loan/credit  becomes
28G.B.  Baldwin,  "NGOs  and  African  Development:  An Enquiry,'  The  World
Bank,  January,  1988,  p. 62.- 51 -
effective.  For  example,  FENACOAC's  role in  financing  small  enterprises  was
delayed  because  the  federation  had insufficient  staff  to  work  with local
cooperatives  in  developing/implementing  activities.  In  Zambia,  Bank
disbursement  procedure  precluded  AFSC  from  training  its  community  development
team  until  the  credit  was effective.  Thus,  the  training  period  itself  cut
into  already  limited  time  allotted  for  the  CD component.
Reporting  methods  and  mechanLsms: NGOs  have  been  generally  held
to  private  contractor  standards  of strict  accountability  for  both  expenditures
and  performance.  They  must  submit  periodic  reports  in each  area  and  are
sometimes  subject  to independent  outside  auditors. The  need  for
accountability  is  not  disputed. However,  reporting  procedures  which  emphasize
quantitative  achievements  are  seldom  able  to  describe  qualitative  aspects  of
development  that  intermediary  NGOs  feel  to  be more  essential--and  for  which
they  have often  been  brought  into  a  project. The  methods  used in  this
qualitative  information-gathering  are  simple  and  informal. As the
Evaluation  Sourcebook  of the  American  Council  of  Voluntary  &'gencies  for
Foreign  Service  (ACVAFS)  notes:
mFor  the  small-scale  community  programs  that  most  PVOs  operate,
notes  or tapes  of carefully  selected  participant  group  discussions
may  be just  as  valid,  and  certainly  more compatible,  than  a  full-
scale  survey  using  a closed-ended,  computer-coded  questionnaire.
The  choice  of  methods  depends  on  what  you  want to  know about  a
program  as  well  as  what  produces  the  desired  results." 29
29ACVAFS,  Evaluation  Sourcebook,  1983,  p. 48.- 52  -
Bank staff  can  assist  in the  development  of a  balanced  reporting
system  by  emphasizing  to  borrower  governments  the  importance  of incorporating
qualitative  assessment.  For  example,  ongoing  process  evaluation  utilizing
beneficiary  assessment  and  focusing  on the  effect  of  NGOs on the  productivity
of  farmers  and  reelers  has  been  built  into  a  current  community-based
soericulture  project  in  India.  Bank  staff  can  also  encourage  the  funding  of
technical  assistance  to SP/intermediary  NGOs to  develop  self-evaluation
capabilities.
contegt
As  with  other  categorles  of  NGOs,  the  context  within  which  an
SP/intermediary  NGO  operates  is  crucial  to its  successful.  involvement  in
project  activity,  as  may  be seen  from  the  following  two  cases.
The  Togo  NGO  Collaborative  project  experienced  substantial  delay
because  of insufficient  attention  to the  relationship  of the  pre-existing
implementing  umbrella  NGO (CONGAT)  with  other  NGOs. As implementation
progressed,  many  NGOs  felt  that  CONGAT  did  not  act  as a legitimate  umbrella
organization,  primarily  because  it  had  developed  its  own  service  branch  which
competed  with  member  NGOs  for  donor  funding. Many  NGOs  resented  the
dependence  that  resulted  from  CONGAT's  control  of funds. These  formed  a
separate  federation  (SLONG)  in opposition  to CONGAT  and its  outspoken
director. Though  the  two  eventually  joined  to  form  FONGTO,  which  now  channels
project  funds,  the  CONGAT  director  and  his  supporters,  particularly  donors
from  developed  countries,  may  continue  to  harbor  grievances.- 53  -
Efforts  to  create  umbrella  groups  for  project  purposes  should  be
approached  with caution. A sudden  influx  of assistance  to a  donor-created
coordinating  body can  diminish  NGO autonomy  by making  collaboration  with  other
groups  a precondition  to  donor  support. If few  NGOs  are  willing  to submit
their  projects  to the  review  of a  coordinating  committee,  collaboration  will
be difficult. Such  an attempt  might  also  trample  fledgling  indigenous
initiatives  for  coordination  which,  if  given  time,  could  eventually  provide
viable  NGO representation  to government  and  donors.
Unanticipated  NGO-government  agency  friction  can  also  create
tension  and  delay.  A consultant  who  performed  a detailed  analysis  of  a
potential  local  intermediary  NGO  partner  in  the  Indonesia  Yogyakarta  Rural
Development  Project  provided  a  particularly  vivid  description  of the  NGO's
political  context. Her  study  ultimately  helped  the  project  avoid  major
coordination  problems  with  government.  She  found  that  the  Bank,  in  discussing
a  community  development  role  for  the  NGO, had  entirely  overlooked  Bang  Des,
the  official  body  in charge  of local  development.  The  Bank  had  been  working
with  BAPPEDAS,  the  provincial  authority,  whose  director  was  engaged  in an
ongoing  personality  and  power  conflict  with  the  Bang  Des  director.  Both
agencies  were  using  Bank  support  of the  NGO  as  a  tool,  thinking  that,  once  the
NGO  and  Bank  resources  were  under  their  coordinating  control,  one  agency  would
be strengthened  against  the  other.  The  NGO itself  was  careful  not to  make a
move  without  being  requested  to  do so  by national  and  local  authorities.  As it
turned  out,  the  NGO  workers  were  allowed  to  participate  only  if they
represented  themselves  to the  villagers  as  Bang  Des  employees,  thus  negating- 54  -
say  advantage  they  might  have  had  as representatives  of an outside  agency  or
NGO.
D.  Contractor  NGOs
In 71 of the  202  projects  (350),  NGOs  participated  as contractors;
they  agreed  to implement  project  components,  technical  assistance  or public
works,  strictly  as delineated  in  requests  for  proposals. They  come  to
projects  with special  expertise,  but  generally  not  with independent
development  agendas. Of the  total  21 Industry/Energy  sector  projects,  17
included  contractor  NGOs,  usually  in a  consultancy/technical  assistance
capacity:  designing  management  and  credit  administration  systems  for  banks,
working  with  power  companies  to  develop  rural  electrification  systems,  and
similar  activities.  Within  the  Infrastructure/Urban  Development  sector,  23  of
the  total  42 projects  involved  NGOs  as  contractors.  ORT (World  Organization
for  Rehabilitation  and  Training),  which  specializes  in transportation  system
development  and  management,  worked  in  the  majority  of these.
In  six  of the  24  projects  reviewed,  NGOs  could  be categorized  as
contractors,  in that  the  roles  they  played  are  very  close  to those  of private
consulting  or construction  firms.
The  Operational  Directive  states:  'when  NGOs  act  as consultants,
they  should  be engaged  following  the  Guidelines  for  the  Use  of Consultants  by
World  Bank  borrowers  and  by the  World  Bank  as Executing  Agency"  (OHS  2.81,  the
Development  of Local  Capabilities  and  Use  of Local  Consultants  and  OMS  2.50,- 55 -
Use  of Consultants).  Some  consultant  NGOs  such  as ORT  and  NRECA (National
Rural  Electrification  Cooperative  Association)  are  comfortable  operating
within  these  guidelines.  They  maintain  a  not-for-profit  status  and  often
manage  independent  development  activities  of their  own  initiation.  For  the
Bank's  purposes,  these  NGOs  need  no special  policy  adaptations.  Nonetheless,
these  consulting  entities  are  NGOs - further  contributing  to  Bank  staff
confusion  over  definition.  However,  other  contractor  NGOs for  lack  of  working
capital  or other  reasons,  cannot  operate  effectively  within  the  procedures
established  for  private  firms.
A number  of  NGOs agreed  to  work  as contractors,  but found  that  the
terms  inhibited  them  from  incorporating  methods  of  operation  used  in  their  own
projects  which  may  have  contributed  to  project  sustainability.  As  seen  below,
the  benefits  of  involving  this  group  of  NGOs were  not  fully  taken  advantage
of--they  may  have  been  better  incorporated  if given  more scope  to  use
distinctive  development  approaches  within  the  project.
Goals  for  Involving  Contractor  NGOs ln  Pro  ects
A clear  objective  for  incorporating  a contractor  NGO is  to take
advantage  of special  knowledge  or skills,  perhaps  regardless  of the  degree  to
which  the  organization  is motivated  by  values. While  differences  in
performance  may  be small,  in  some  cases,  a "value-driven"  orientation  may  be a
benefit. In the  Ghana  Water  Supply  and  Rehabilitation  project,  for  example,
Public  Administration  Services  (PAS)  was  able  to  underbid  private  firms  for
the  management  consultancy.  PAS  had  some  cost  advantage  because  of its- 56 -
not-for-prof  i  tax  status,  and  PAS  also  maintains  a low  overhead  and  no
overseas  offices. PAS'  performance  was  also  enhanced  in that  PAS  consultants
were  not  preoccupied  by bottom-line  profit  considerations  and  were  willing  to
lend  assistance  in  areas  beyond  those  delineated  by terms  of reference.
Cost  is  often  a factor  in involving  contractor  NGOs.  The  low  cost
of  NGO assistance  is  an advantage  touted  by many,  even though  a conclusive
empirical  analysis  of NGO  costs  vis-a-vis  government  agencies  and  private
firms  has  yet to  be done.  This  small  sample  produced  mixed  results. In
public  works,  CARE's  road  construction  in  Sierra  Leone's  Eastern  Integrated
Agricultural  project  was  relatively  expensive,  primarily  because  CARE  refused
to  compromise  on quality  to  reduce  costs. However,  in the  Liberia  Second
Education  Project,  CARE  was  able  to construct  primary  schools  at a cost
estimated  to  be 30  percent  less  than  that  of for-profit  contractors.  In
technical  assistarce  components,  PAS  was relatively  less  expensive  to  hire,
while  ORT  consultants  are  paid  market--or  close  to  market--rates.
The  Bank's  experienct  with  CARE  as  contractor  in  Liberia  supports
the*  contention  that,  because  the  NGO  was  hired  primarily  for  its  low-cost
construction  capability,  it  did  not  contribute  as fully  as it  might  have.
CARE  was initially  assumed  by the  Bank  to  be working  as a service-
provider/intermediary,  since  it  considers  one  of its  strengths  to  be
motivating  communities  to  participate  in  self-help  efforts. However,  in  both
Liberia  and  Sierra  Leone,  CARE  implemented  only  its  primary  tasks  as
delineated  in contracts. In  Liberia,  CARE  was selected  to  build  100  schools
(85  of  which  were completed).  CARE's  proven  track  record  with  cost-efficient- 57 -
construction,  made  cheaper  with  voluntary  community  labor,  made it a  much  more
attractive  candidate  than  local  contractors,  well-known  to  be too  expensive,
ill-equipped,  and  only  moderately  skilled,  or the  Hinistry  of Public  Works,
which  did  not  judge  itself  capable  of such  a large  undertaking.
CARE  did  not  work  with the  communities  to create  a role  for  the
schools  in  the  villages--in  fact,  some  buildings  went  unused  because  no one
knew to  whom  they  belonged. The  project  completion  report  and  a later
government  review  of the  education  sector  noted  that  many  of the  schools  had
deteriorated  because  villages  had  not  been involved  in  planning  for
maintenance. 30 The  CARE  project  manager  (now  in  Honduras)  was  recently  asked
his  perspective  on the  project.  He said  that  inasmuch  as  Liberia  was  his first
CARE  country  assignment,  he was  not forceful  enough  in dealing  with  the  Bank
on  participation  issues. If  he were to  deal  with the  Bank  now,  he would
assure  CARE  of a community  organization  as  well  as construction  role.
Contracting  Procedures
Agreements  with contractor  NGOs  are  usually  similar  to those  which
regulate  relationships  with  private  firms. The  project  delays  and
implementation  obstacles  caused  by lack  of attention  to the  special  needs  of
some  contractor  NGOs indicate  a  need for  flexibility  in  contracting
procedures.
30PCR,  1983. Conrad  Snyder  & Joane  Nagel,  The Struggle  Continues:  World
Bank  and  African  Develogment  Bank  Investments  in  Liberian  Educational
Davglo2pMn (1972-1985),  Ministry  of Education,  Liberia,  Chapter  5,  p. 118.- 58  -
Whereas  private  contractors  typically  work on an expense-
reimbursement  cycle,  a not-for-profit  NGO is  unlikely  to  have the  capital
reserves  necessary  to fund  construction  while  awaiting  reimbursement.  This
became  clear  to  project  staff  working  on the  Mali  Health  Development  Project,
in  which  ADAUA (l'Association  pour le  Developpement  d'une  Architecture  Naturel
et d'un  Urbanisme  Africans),  an  NGO from  Burkina  Faso,  was contracted  to  build
health  centers. ADAUA  was  selected  because  of its  unique  expertise  in
stabilized-soil  construction  technology.3'Problems  arose  when the  NGO  tried  to
undertake  work on three  sites  simultaneously,  thereby  overextending  its
supervisory  and  financial  capacity. Funds  were  disbursed  through  the  Ministry
of Health,  contingent  on  verification  and  certification  of  work completed.
Such  certification  was the  responsibility  of the  Ministry  of Public  Works
which  was  often  slow  to inspect  and  certify  work completed,  and  which  sought
to  block  further  advances  to  ADAUA,  which  was  treated  as a  private  contractor.
The  Ministry  of  Health,  in  turn,  occasionally  authorized  further  advances. In
the  final  analysis,  the  system  of control  and  verification  broke  down,
important  sums  could  not  fully  be accounted  for,  and the  Government  imposed
force  account  procedures.
The  Bank  might  alleviate  such  financial  difficulties  by setting  up
a special  revolving  fund  to  cover  expenses  while  awaiting  reimbursement;  in
that  way the  highly  successful  El Salvador  Second  Urban  Development  project
made  allowances  for  FUNDASAL's  financial  position.
31This  technology  uses  primarily  local  materials  and  results  in cooler
interiors  than  do the  typical  buildings  of  concrete  and  galvanized  roofing.- 59 -
In  the  Yogyakarta  Rural  Development  Project,  Dian  Desa,  an
appropriate  technology  NGO,  was  also  subject  to  goverment  rigidity  concerning
contractors.  It  had  agreed  with  the  Bank  and  Public  Health  Department  to
construct  ferrous  cement  water  cisterns  which  could  collect  water  during  the
dry  season.  When  the  NGO  found  itself  covering  expenses  and  persistently
requesting  reimbursement,  it  was told  that  it  was  not  a wbona-fidew  contractor
and  would  have  to  go  through  government  for  all  procurement.  Since  tanks  were
constructed  simultaneously  in  many areas,  the  use  of  a  single  supplier  for  all
of  them  caused  delays.  Additionally,  the  government  did  not  permit  forward
purchase  of  cement  needed  to  begin  construction  when  a  water  shortage  eased.
Inasmuch  as  these  agreements  are  often  dependent  on borrower
government  policies,  the  Bank could  be  instrumental  in  influencing  flexible
terms.  It  will  help  when  Bank  staff  recognize  types  of  special  contracting
arrangements  which  might  be  necessary  to  involve  an  NGO.
Identification/selection  of  contractor  NGOs via-as-vis  oublic  agencies  or
private  for-orof  it firms.
Questions  have  been  raised  about  the  temporary  nature  of  building
local  NGO  capacity,  when increasing  government  or private  capacity  may  more
effectively  lead,  particularly  in  Africa,  to a  reduced  exodus  of professionals
or to  a more  sustainable  building  and  maintenance  operation. While  an  NGO  may
appear  to  be  the  only  viable  option  in  a  country  with  an  underdeveloped- 60 -
private  sector,  allowing  it  to  meet the  project-created  demand  may  delay
development  of local,  private  (for-profit)  firms.
Thls  may  point  to a  need for  NGOs  to  help "work  themselves  out  of
business.0  This  could  be done,  for  example,  by emphasizing  training  of
government  or private  workers.  A contract  mlght  also  stipulate  NGO support  of
the  prlvate  sector,  in  the  form  of subcontracting  to local  firms,  or it  might
require  training  of local  people  during  the  project. The  training  component
of the  Mali  Health  project  has  been  considered  a  moderately  successful  ADAUA
achievement,  though  it is  till  too  early  to gauge  the  multiplier  effect  in
terms  of generating  new  entrepreneurial  ventures. In Sierra  Leone,  where  CARE
was  contracted  for  road  construction,  it  handed  over  its  heavy  machinery  to
the  Ministry  of Public  Works  after  implementation.  Similarly,  NGOs  might  be
encouraged  to sell  their  machinery  off  at concessional  prices  or  with soft
financing  to  small  private  firms.
With  the  possible  exception  of consultant  NGOs  such  as ORT,
contracting  NGOs  often  involves  issues  beyond  those  inherent  in  hiring  private
firms. If  an NGO is  deemed  the  best  alternative,  not  only  is it important  to
analyze  the  NGO's  institutional  capacity  and  the  special  contracting
arrangement  necessary,  but also  to  consider  whether  the  NGO's  strengths  are
boing  put to full  use  under  the  contracting  arrangement.- 61 -
E.  Cooneratives
Forty-one  of the  202  projects  involved  creation  of or coordination
with  _aoperatives.  Six  of the  cooperatives  are  comprised  of artisans  and  35
of low-income  farmers. Of these,  25  are  in agricultural  projects  in  Africa.
Many are  oriented  towards  crop  production/marketing,  livestock  development,  or
dairy  production.  Though  this  paper  cannot  encompass  the  numerous  issues
surrounding  cooperatives,  several  interesting  issues  arose  from  an
institutionally-oriented  review  of the  six  projects  in the  sample  24  with
cooperative  involvement.
Goals  for  InvolQi2n  Cooperatives  in Projects
The  Bank  has  categorized  production-related'  people's
organizations  as a type  of  NGO (OMS  5.30). Cooperatives  work for  the  benefit
of  members  and  their  principal  objective  is to increase  incomes;  they  do not,
therefore,  always  fit  the  image  of NGOs  as altruistic  and  service-oriented.
The Bank's  goal  in supporting  cooperatives  is to  enable  their  eventual  self-
sustaining,  autonomous  activity  as  private  firms. They  can  be considered  NGOs
only  if one  recognizes  that  cooperatives  have  ends  beyond  those  which  are
atrictly  economic,  particularly  social  equity. Then  they  may  be included  with
other  organizations  working  to  enable  primarily  low-income  persons  to
participate  more fully  in  the  private  and  public  sectors.
T$ree  of the  cooperative  projects  in  our  sample  are  widely
considered  by Bank  staff  interviewed  as successful:  The Ituri  Livestock. 62 -
project  in Zaire  Illustrates  how cooperatlves  can  successfully  achLeve  both
objectlves  of increased  ineome  and  increased  polltical  leverage  for  project
beneficiaries. The  project  implementation  unlt  catalyzed  the  formatlon  of 117
llvestock  producers'  associations  (PRODELs)  and  a federatlon  (ACOOPELI)  whlch
pools  PRODEL  resources  for  purchasing  veterlnary  medicines  and  represents
herder  interests  to  the  project  unit,  government,  and  donors.  The  enthusiastic
response  of farmers  to cooperative  ideas  was  unexpected;  far  beyond  taklng
over  the  cattle  dipping  program  as  planned,  the  PRODELs  retall  veterinary
supplles  to  members,  manage  communal  pastures,  curb  rustling,  and  defend
herdmen's  lnterests  at the  local  level.
In the  Turkey  Livestock  project,  over  800  farmers  in 12  regions
are  benefLtting  from  Turkey  Development  Foundation-established  poultry
cooperatives.  In the  much-acclaimed  India  Dairy  Project,  the  Bank's  switch
from  support  of state-run  dairy  operations  to support  of "Operation
Flood32has  enabled  the  project  to  cover  all  but  one  of India's  states  and
territories,  with  over 30,000  Dairy  Cooperacive  Societies.  Operation  Flood
activities  are  noted  to  have 'demonstrated  profound  social  and  economlc
consequences,  as cooperatlve  profits  are  used  to finance  communal  resources  of
education,  water  supplies,  health  services,  and  access  roads."33
320peration  Flood  is  based  on the  AMUL  model,  which  has  a number  of  key
institutional  features:  member-elected  boards,  democratic  and  accountable
operations,  employment  of  professional  managers,  cooperative  ownership  and
management  of processing,  marketing,  and  productlon  assets,  and  autonomy  of
decision-making  related  to  pricing. Each  Dairy  Cooperative  Society  is a
member  of a regional  producer's  union,  which  in turn  is  a  member  of a state
Federation.  Federation  representatives  participate  in  the  overall
polieymaking  of the  National  Cooperative  Dairy  Federation  of India.
33Staff  Appraisal  Report,  p. 4.- 63 -
issues arisin.  from  the Involvement  of cooperatives  in  urolect  activity
From  the  review  of these  three  cooperative  NGOs  and  a fourth,
UCCAO  in  Cameroon,  not  considered  a success,  we raise  three  issues:
1)  Sustainability  of  cooperatives  is  still  a  question  in  both the
Zaire  and  Turkey  livestock  projects.  Enabling  grassroots  aconomic
organizations  to  operate  free  of  project  support  (i.e,  donor
funding  and  intermediary  NGO  support  services)  is  possibly  the
most  difficult  aspect  of implementation.  In  Turkey,  TKV  continues
-^ supply  managerial  and  technical  services  for  which  member
farmers  do  not  pay.  It is  not  clear  how the  cooperatives  might
remain  competitive  if  they  are  bereft  of TKV  services  or they  must
pay for  them  out  of profits.  In Zaire,  the  PRODELs  and  ACOOPELI
continue  to  receive  project  support  in subsequent  projects.
ACOOPELI  still  relies  on donated  veterinary  supplies  from  Canada.
2)  Proper  institutional  analysis  is  as important  in  dealing  with
cooperatives  and  other  NGOs  as it is in  working  with  public  or
purely  private  sector  entities. Sustainability  is  not  only  a
financial  issue,  but  also  an institutional  one. UCCAO,  a  union  of
six  Western  Province  cooperatives  in  the  Cameroon  Western
Highlands  Project  was  active  only  in the  processing  and  marketing
of arabica  coffee  but,  in the  absence  of strong  government
services  in  the  West,  UCCAO's  functions  were  expanded  to fill  the64  -
needs  of the  entire  agricultural  development  project. This
included  not  only  coffee  production,  but  also  small  animal
husbandry,  tree  planting,  bottomland  development,  water  supply,
food  production,  and  an  extension  service. This  proved  to  be an
overly  large  burden  for  UCCAO;  the  entire  nature  of the
organization  was  altered  by this  influx  of funding  and
responsibilities,  some  of  which  later  had to  be transferred  to
government  agricultural  services.
3)  A final  issue  is that  of examining  the  cooperative  network  within
context. The  Camerooh  project  tried  to support  cooperatives
without  consideration  of  UCCAO's  position  vis-a-vis  its  member
cooperatives  or their  members. During  project  preparation,  it
appeared  that  UCCAO  was a functionally  representative  organ  of the
cooperatives,  when,  in  fact,  the  cooperatives  saw  UCCAO  as purely
a service  organization  and  had  monitored  its  activities  closely  to
limit  its  power. By gaining  control  over  all  project  resources
and  developing  an implementation  network  parallel  to  the
cooperative  network,  UCCAO  increased  its  influence  substantially.
The  cooperative  managers  feel  that  their  interests  have  not  been
met through  this  arrangement.  To the  farmer-members,  whose
interests  often  differ  from  those  of the  managers,  UCCAO  is  a far-
removed,  almost  governmental  body.  OED's  recent  review  further
substantiated  the  'need  for  a  more detailed  understanding  of the- 65 -
power  realities  in  the  institutional  and  political  environment  in
which  rural  development  projects  operate."  3*
IV.  THE  BANK'S  ROLE  IN  FACILITATING  GOVERNMENT--NGO  RELATIONSHIPS
Borrower  government  cooperation  is a  determining  factor  in  the
successful  integration  of  NGOs into  Bank-sponsored  projects. The  stipulation
that  Bank  funds  must,  according  to its  Articles  of  Agreement,  go through
government,  often  discourages  NGOs  that  might  otherwise  see  great  potential  in
participating  in a Bank-sponsored  project. Depending  on the  country,  NGOs  can
often  receive  funding  from  private  and  bilateral  donors  more  directly;
bureaucratic  obstacles  inherent  in  working  through  government  agencies  put  the
Bank  at a comparative  disadvantage.  The  Bank  is  well-positioned,  however,  to
foster  effective  relationships  between  governments  and  NGOs.
Michael  Bratton's  summary  of NGO-government  relations  in  Africa
applies  to  a  number  of  the  projects  reviewed,  in  all  regions:
'Whether  NGOs are  international  or  community-baspe,  all  operate
within  the  boundaries  of  a  nation-state  and  at  the  pleasure  of  a
sovereign  government.  Because  governments  resist  any  reduction  of
their  leadership  role  in  development,  they  are  likely  to  seek  to
control  NGOs  by enacting  legal  and  administrative  regulations  to
govern  the  voluntary  sector.  For  their  part,  NGOs  are  among  the
only  formal  organizations  to enjoy  a degree  of autonomy  from
government  and  to  have  a direct  presence  among  mobilized
communities  at the  grassroots  level..  .Governments  and  NGOs
3'OED,  Rural  Develooment:  World  Bank  Exoerience  1965-86,  The  World  Bank,
April  1988,  p. 60.- 66 -
therefore  find  themselves  in a  new  antd  challenging  juxtaposition
that  requires  leaders  on  both sides  to  ponder  the  potential  for
conflict  or  complementarity  between  their  institutions." 25
Many  of the  bureaucratic  obstacles  which  delayed  implementation  in
the  Bank-sponsored  projects  were  manifestations  of government  hesitancy  to
allow  autonomous  NGO  activity. The  issue  for  the  Bank is  how to  best  design  a
government-NGO  partnership  in  which  the  government  is  aware  of,  yet does  not
exercise  detailed  control  of,  NGO  activities.  Turning  otherwise  autonomous
institutions  into  de facto  branches  of government  could  squelch  those  aspects
of  NGOs  which  make them  particularly  valuable  to development.
In some  projects,  the  conflict  was at the  national  level  where
officials  were  hesitant  to  relinquish  implementation  responsibilities  to an
outside  agency--afraid  that  channelling  control  or funding  to  NGOs  would
reduce  their  own leadership  role. This  helps  to  explain  the  Guatemalan
government's  hesitance  to transfer  administration  of the  Reconstruction
project's  small  enterprise  development  component  from  BANVI  (the  national
housing  bank)  to FENACOAC,  a federation  viewed  as  unsympathetic  to the
government.
This  fear  can  be combined  with the  desire  of central  government
agencies  not to look  incompetent.  In Turkey,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture
(MAFRA)  displayed  such  sentiments  in its  lack  of  cooperation  with  TKV in
implementation  of the  Livestock  project. Though  government  priorities  lay
V"Michael  Bratton,  The  Politics  of  Government-NGO  Relations  in Africa,
July 1988,  p.5.- 67  -
elsewhere,  the  Bank  pushed  hard  to  add  the  poultry  component,  specifying  TKV
as implementor  because  of the  NGO's  proven  successes.  Using  the  premise  that
some  TKV  enterprises  operate  with commercial  methods  and  generate  income,
MAFRA  balked  at reimbursing  expenses. Project  officers  note,  however,  MAFRA's
own  lack  of success  with  poultry  projects.
In  other  cases,  national  officials  were fully  supportive  of NGO
participation,  but  state  or local  officials  viewed  NGO involvement  as
threatening.  The  Project  Performance  Audit  Report  for  the  India  Dairy  project
states  that  *without  [state  government's]  negative  influences,  the  outcome  of
Operation  Flood  and  the  Bank-assisted  projects  doubtless  would  have  been
greater  than  that  actually  attained.".  Though  national  officials  expressed
willingness  to support  Operation  Flood,  state  officials  had  little  incentive
to support  the  cooperative  movement,  yet  much to  gain  in  propagating  state-
run  dairies. These,  though  extremely  unsanitary  and inefficient,  maintain
thousands  of jobs.  Politicians  cultivate  urban  votes  by holding  down  producer
prices  and  protecting  the  interests  of  private  dairies  and  middlemen.
Sometimes  authorities  find  it (asier  to  work  with  NGOs at the
local  level.  In the  Kenya  Population  project,  NGO-government  coordination  of
population  activities  generally  happens  more  often  and  with  better  results  at
the  district  and local  levels  than  at the  national  level.  While  supportive  of
NGO  involvement,  national-level  officials  are  concerned  with  macro  policy
issues  and  delineation  of resp.nnsibilities  along  Ministry  lines.  Coordination
at the  micro  level  is informal,  stimulated  by the  need  to share  resources.- 68 -
The  reactions  of government  to  NGO  participation  in  Bank-financed
projects  have  an economic  basis  In  so far  as the  government  sees  NGOs  as
diluting  scarce  development  resources. In  most developing  countries,
legitimate  demands  on government  far  outstrip  its  financial  resources. In
addition,  procedural  difficulties  arise  because  official  agreements  with  NGOs
are  often  awkwardly  new  to governments,  NGOs,  and  the  Bank.  Finally,  there
may  be political  problems. The  political  perspective  is the  most  complex,
especially  from  the  view of Bank  staff  who  may find  it  difficult  to  understand
the  political  environment  within  which  NGOs  operate  and  to  help  a
confrontational  government-NGO  relationship  evolve  into  a  cooperative  one.
As Michael  Bratton  has  observed,  governments  which  derive  their
legitimacy  from  their  capacity  to  make  good  on  promises  of economic  and  social
advancement  will  not  want  to admit  they  have  performed  poorly because  of the
implication  this  holds  for  their  right  to  power. 36 As in  the  Sierra  Leone
project,  where  the  government  was frustrated  that  CARE  received  credit  from
beneficiaries  for  government-financed  road  construction,  governments  may  be
unwilling  to allow  others  besides  the  State  to  get  credit  for  development
activities.  The challenge  for  Bank  staff  is  to convince  government  that  NGO-
supported  projects  can  extend  government  capabilities  rather  than  compete  with
the  public  sector  for  local  power  bases.
The  political  aspect  of NGO-government-Bank  interaction  also
brings  in the  role  of  policy  advocacy  NGOs.  The  anti-government  stance  of
36OD.  cit.,  Bratton,  p. 12.- 69 -
many  advocacy  groups  sometimes  makes  them  almost  off-limits  to Bank  staff,  who
must  be careful  not to  offend  a  host  government. In  the  early  days  of  both
the  Tondo  Foreshore  and  Narmada  Dam  Projects,  Bank  staff  were severely
reprimanded  by  government  and  Bank  management  for  speaking  vich indigenous
policy  advocacy  NGOs.  The  Philippine  and  Indian  governments  felt  threatened
by the  organized  opposition  represented  by these  groups. In  both situations,
the  NGOs  later  turned  out  to  be invaluable  sources  of local  information  to the
Bank,  thus  moving  from  a  confrontational  stance  vis-a-vis  the  Bank  to  an
informal  advisory  one.  While  ZOTO continued  to  be  repressed  by  the  Philippine
government,  in  India  the  NGO's  local  knowledge  and  political  base  eventually
won  it  respect  from  government. In  the  Brazil  projects  (Itaparica  and
Northeast  Development),  the  rural  workers'  unions  began  as  outside  agitators,
but  eventually  negotiated  a contract  with  the  power  utility  subsidiary.  Labor
unions  are  also  represented  at the  national  level  in the  Northeast  Development
project,  and  they  receive  a  percentage  of project  funds  to implement  training
programs  for  local  NGOs.
The  acceptance  of  policy  advocacy  groups  by government  seems  to
depend  on the  government  attitudes  toward  dissent,  the  NGOs'  abilities  to
organize  local  power  bases,  and  their  willingness  to move  beyond
confrontational  tactics  to  negotiation.  While  the  Bank's  primary
relationships  are  with its  member  governments,  Bank  willingness  ta listen  to
the  views  of advocacy  groups  can influence  governments  to take  their  views
seriously.- 70  -
There  have  been relatively  few  examples  of fully  collaborative
trilateral  arrangements  among  governments,  NGOs,  and the  Bank.  The  Yemen  Arab
Republic  Education  projects  have  met  with success  because  officials  are
convinced  that  the  projects  both fulfill  beneficiary  needs  and  reflect  well  on
government.  Government  representation  at every  level  is  more  a symbol  of
support  than  a controlling  irfluence. The  Kenya  Population  projects  are  also
building  what is  expected  to  become  a replicable  model. The  National  Council
for  Population  and  Development  (NCPD)  is  responsible  for  coordinating  all
family  planning-related  NGO  activity. NGOs see  the  advantages  to such
centralized  functions  and  are  generally  positive  as to  NCPD's  future
capabilities  (See  Case  Study,  Appendix  B).
Some  more  recent  projects  are  indicative  of  changing  government
attitudes  towards  NGOs.  Many  of the  most  promising  NGO-government  linkages
have  occurred  in  Asian  countries,  where  governments  are  relatively  strong  and
thus  less  threatened  by NGOs.  In  the  Philippines,  for  example,  NGO leaders
are  working  with  President  Aquino's  government  on a Health  Development
Project,  as well  as on such  policy  issues  as land  reform  and  rural  employment
generation. Ln  Latin  America,  projects  such  as Bolivia's  Emergency  Social
Fund  show  encouraging  changes: NGOs  work  with  government  to  plan,  design,  and
implement  projects  which  will address  the  needs  of those  hardest  hit  by
recession  and structural  adjustment.  NGO  partners  are  becoming  more
acceptable--especially  for  service  delivery. Latin  American  governments  tend
to be  vocally  supportive  of community  participation,  but their  motives  in
involving  NGOs  may  sometimes  center  more  around  the  cultivation  of political- 71 -
support  and  cost  recovery  than  empowerment  of the  poor.37  Because  many  Latin
American  NGOs see  their  basic  role  as  helping  poor  people  become  more
assertive  and  better  organized  to  press  their  claims,  many  NGO-government
relationships  will  continue  to  have  antagonistic  overtones.
NGO involvement  in  Bank-financed  projects  is  more  prevalent  in
Africa  than  anywhere  else,  in  part  because  governmental  institutions  are
relatively  weak there. But  the  weakness  of  African  governments  may  also  make
NGO-government  tensions  more  difficult  to reconcile  in this  region. Many  of
the  problems  mentioned  in this  chapter  tend  to  be more  severe  in  Africa  than
elsewhere,  though  recent  experiences,  such  as the  promising  Grassroots
Development  Initiatives  Project  in  Togo,  illustrate  the  increasing  willingness
of governments,  even in  Africa,  to  entrust  project  responsibilities  to  NGOs.
V.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
This  paper  has  reviewed  the  nature  and  scope  of  NGO involvement  in
24  Bank  projects. To date,  202  projects  have  been identified  that  have
involved  NGOs;  this  represents  only  five  percent  of Bank  projects. The
present  sample  represents  approximately  10  percent  of these  Bank  projects.
The  review  shows  that,  in  general,  NGOs  have  contributed  positively  to  the
success  of Bank  projects  by facilitating  beneficiary  participation,  by
37Sheldon  Annis,  "Can  Small-Scale  Development  be a Large-Scale  Policy?
The  Case  of Latin  America,"  World  DeveloRment,  Supplement,  Autumn,  1987,
p. 132.72 -
highlighting  environmental  issues,  and  by assisting  in the  delivery  of
services  to low-income  groups. Problems,  of course,  have  arisen  and  will
continue  to arise  on the  question  of the  proper  role  of  NGOs in  Bank  projects.
Bank-NGO-collaboration  must  be informed  by a balanced  assessment  of the
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  NGOs.
The  potential  benefits  of NGO  participation  in Bank  projects  are
several:
a.  They  have demonstrated  skills  and  experience  in identifying
community  needs  and  promoting  community  participation.
b.  They  have  been articulate  and forceful  contributors  to  policy
reform,  particularly  in  issues  concerning  the  environment.
C.  They  have  provided  innovative  models  for  action  which  have  been
scaled  up or replicated  by governments  on a national  scale.
d.  They  have  a comparative  advantage  in  the  low-cost  delivery  of
services  to  relatively  vulnerable  and  inaccessible  groups  of
beneficiaries,  and  augment  the  potential  for  cost  recovery.
e.  They  are  also  known  for  their  long-term  commitment  to  development
efforts  and  for  their  strong  advocacy  role  on  behalf  of
disadvantaged  groups. This is  a potentially  valuable  asset  in the
context  of  poverty  reduction. Development  of autonomous,  self-- 73  -
reliant  grassroots  organization.  has  been  shown to  be  correlated
with  project  sustainability.3  Additionally,  as  has  been  noted at
Bank-NGO  meetings,  the  priority  placed  on  mitigating  the  negative
effects  of  structural  and  sectoral  adjustment  loans  on  the  poor
(or  changing  the  design  of  program  loans  to  enhance  their  positive
effects  on  the  poor)  points  to  the  growing  need  to  solicit  NGO
input  from  the  preparation  stage.
The  Bank  should  also  be  aware  of  the  limitations  of  NGOs  and  the
pitfalls  in  working  with  them.
1.  The  idvocacy  role  of  NGOs  often  injects  a  sense  of  antagonism  in
their  relations  with  governments.
2.  The  strong  interest  of  many  NGOs  in  local  problems  and  their
commitment  to  grassroots  level  action  generally  tend  to  make  them
less  sensitive  to  macro-economic  problems  and  to  the  need  for  an
enabling  macro-economic  environment.
3.  NGOs  may  be  hostile  not  only  to  governments,  but  also  to  one
another.  Parochial  interests  could  cause  them  to  behave
defensively.  This  tendency  merits  attention  wherever  inter-NGO
collaboration  is  involved  in  development  projects.
,E2D,  Sustainabilitv  of  Proiects:  First  Review  of  Exnerience,  June  14,
1985,  paras.  3.04-3.08.- 74
4.  NGOa are  not  generally  well  endowed  in terms  of  financial  and
managerial  resources.  This  is  particularly  true  of  indigenous
NGOs which  have  often  been  unable  to scale  up their  activities.
The scope  and  quality  of  Bank-NGO  collaboration  can  be improved  in
several  ways.  First  of  all,  the  Bank  should  increase  its  understanding  of
NGOs in  relation  to  their  operational  functions  and  purposes;  second,  NGOs
should  contribute  more to  project  design,  while  continuing  to  participate  in
the  implementation  of  projects;  and  third,  Bank  collaboration  with  borrower
governments  should  help  create  an  enabling  environment  in  which  NGOs  may
operate  to their  fullest  potential.
A.  Increase  Bank  Staff  Awareness  of NGOs
It  is  clear  from  the  many interviews  conducted  with  Bank  staff  for
this  review  that  there  is  a less  than  complete  understanding  of the  nature  of
NGOs  and  their  potential  contribution  to the  development  process. Most  Bank
staff  are  not  familiar  with  NGO  matters. A good  understanding  of the  nature,
scope  and  diversity  of NGOs,  and  the  contributions  different  types  of NGOs  can
make to  Bank  projects  would  be most  useful  to operational  staff  working  on
projects  with  potential  for  Bank-NGO  collaboration.  Positive  recent  steps
toward  increasing  Bank  awareness  have  been  SPRIE's  advisory  service,  the  OD of
1989 (No.  14.70),  selected  staff  or  consultant  reports,3 9and  staff  training
seminars.
39See  particularly  G. B. Baldwin,  op cit.,  and  Michael  Cernea,  gn.  cit.- 75  -
The ability  of  Bank staff  to  identify  NGOs  seemed  reasonably
accurate  only  in  the  center  of  our  spectrum  (see  p.8).  Some  of  the  staff
thought  that  coummity  associations  were  quasi-governmental  bodies  (though
these  giroups were  not  part  of  the  formal  government  apparatus)  and  that
political  action  groups,  particularly  those  close  to  the  communities  of
beneficiaries,  were  para-political  bodies  (though  they  had  no  formal  political
affiliation).  Contractor  NGOs  were  often  thought  to  be  in  the  for-profit
private  sector  while  cooperatives  were  treated  as  a  class  by  themselves,  yet
much closer  to  private  enterprises  than  what  are  commonly perceived  to  be
NGOs.  It  is  likely  that  the  increased  exposure  of  Bank staff  to  NGOs  through
operational  work  will  improve  their  understanding  and  appreciation  of  this
important  category  of  development  agents.
Rnegommendations:
1.  The  Bank  and  NGOs  sl-ould  better  understand  their  resnectime-
strengths  and  weaknesses.  This  review  underscores  the  need  to  devote
increased  resources  to  understand  potential  NGO  partners  from  several
perspectives:  the  compatibility  of  their  goals  with  those  of  the  Bank,  their
technical  expertise  and  experience,  their  institutional  soundness,  and  the
quality  of  their  relationships  with  government,  other  donors,  other  NGOs  and
beneficiaries.  A considerable  amount of  work has  already  been  done  to
compile  directories  and  to  analyze  country  level  NGO  activities  which  will  no
doubt  facilitate  this  task.  The Bank's  NGO  liaison  office  (SPRIE),  as  well  as
many regional  offices,  resident  representatives  and  others  are  now collecting- 76  -
information  and  facilitating  Bank-NGO  contacts. The  Bank  has also  begun  to
furnish  more information  about  its  activities  to  NGOs  to improve  their
understanding  of Bank  capabilities  and  limitations  and  to encourage  NGO
involvement  early  in  the  project  cycle. Clearly,  further  strengthening  of
these  activities  will  call  for  an increased  allocation  of Bank  resources.
2.  Increase  Bank  Staff  Training. Bank  staff  working  on sectors  with
potential  for  collaboration  with  NGOs should  be properly  equipped  to  work  with
the  latter.  For  example,  short-term  training  may  be  organized  for  them  to
learn  more  about  NGOs  and  their  potential  role  in  Bank  projects. (the  first
seminar  t:sing  NGO  case  studies  was  held  by SPRIE  in  March,  the  second  in
October  of 1989). Opportunities  may  be created  for  Bank  staff  to  meet  NGO
leaders,  and  key government  officials  who  have experience  in  working  with
NGOs.  Staff  may also  learn  from  NGO  leaders  and  experts  who  are invited  to
join  Bank  missions  in  which  the  former  participate.
3.  Initiate  Sector  Work  on NGOs. The  Bank's  knowledge  of  NGOs  can  be
enhanced  through  systematic  sector  work  on their  operations  in  selected
countries  and  sectors  where  they  are  known  to  be active,  and  where  the
potential  for  Bank-NGO collaboration  seems  reasonably  bright.  In  many  cases,
the  related  field  work and  analysis  of  data  can  be entrusted  to local
consultants.  Expanded  sector  work is a  cost-effective  means  for  Bank  staff  to
assess  the  level  of devwlopment  and  the  strengths  %nd  weaknesses  of  NGOs.77 -
B.  The  Role  of NGOs in  Project  Vork
The  NGOs'  most  valuable  contributions  to  development,  namely,
their  vision  and  grassroots  level  experience,  have  been overlooked  in  many  of
the  Bank-NGO  interactions.  The  effective  development  NGO,  especially  of the
policy/advocacy  and  intermediary  varieties,  can  understand  and  articulate
people's  needs  and initiate  effective  action  to  meet  them  better  than  many
other  agencies. Most  of these  NGOs  act  as a  bridge  between  beneficiaries  and
the  outside  world  imparting  new  knowledge  and  motivating  people  in  ways  which
are  compatible  with their  cultural  beliefs  and  traditions.  The  communication
of  project  objectives  and  procedures  to  beneficiaries  and  of  beneficiaries'
values  and  behavior  to project  managers,  the  provision  of services  to
beneficiaries  so  as to  assure  their  effective  utilization,  and  the
sustainability  of  project  achievements  through  their  incorporation  in the
beneficiaries'  culture  are  dimensions  to  which  both  the  Bank  and  NGOs  attach
the  greatest  importance.  NGOs'  strengths  in these  areas  can  be fully  drawn
upon  only  when they  are  able  to  play  a  more  active  role in  Bank  projects.
In the  past,  NGOs  were  used  in  Bank  projects  primarily  (in  57
percent  of the  cases)  as implementors.  Those  involved  in  pre.ject  design  and
planning  accounted  only  for  11  percent  of the  cases. Some  types  of  NGOs  such
as  community  associations  have  had  very  limited  involvement  in  Bank  projects.
An unintended  consequence  of this  approach  is the  tendency  to limit  NGOs  to
the  role  of service  providers  though  their  strength  lies  in  long-term
community  development. This  has led  to  a mismatch  in several  Bank  projects
between  the  comparative  advantage  of  NGOs  and  the  roles  prescribed  for  them  by- 78  -
the  Bank. On the  other  hand,  where  NGOu  were identified  with  great  care  and
their  potential  capabilities  in  given  project  contexts  were systematically
evaluated,  there  emerged  a  better  fit  between  the  NGOs  and  Bank  projects. The
role  of local  development  associations  in the  YAR  education  project  and that
of FUNDASAL  in the  El Salvador  second  urban  development  project  illustrate
this  point.
Recommendations:
1.  Involve  NGOs  Further  Upstream. As noted  above,  NGOs generally
become  involved  in  Bank  projects  during  implementation.  Yet, it is in the
planning'and  design  stages  that  the  NGO's  distinct  experience  and  vision  can
best  be brought  into  the  decision  making  process  regarding  projects. This is
particularly  true  of community  associations  and  policy  advocacy  NGOs.  The  NGO
can  be more effective  during  project  implementation  especially  if it  had  a
prior  role  in the  design  stage.
2.  Develop  Creative  Financing  Mechanisms. Experience  with  NGOs  has
shown  that  the  funding  arrangements  typically  used for  private,  for-profit
entities  often  hinder  NGO  participation  in  projects. NGOs'  typically  under-
capitalized  financial  structures  and  non-profit  orientation  point  to the  need
for  more  flexible  funding  mechanisms.  A revolving  fund,  for  example,  can  make
advances  available  to them  so  as to facilitate  disbursements  to local
beneficiary  groups  in time (e.g.,  distribution  of agricultural  inputs).
Balancing  accountability  with  autonomy  requires  carefully  negotiated
agreements  between  the  borrower,  the  Bank,  and  the  NGO  as to expenditure- 79 -
approval  and  disbursement  processes  for  payments  through  special  accounts  and
funds,  government-NCO  contracts,  or other  appropriate  mechanisms.
3.  Learn  from  NGO involvement  in  proiects. Much  of  what the  NMO
imparts  in  a  development  project  are  the  intangible  yet  important  inputs  of
motivation,  education,  and  organization.  The  ways  in  which  an  NGO  interacts
with  and  influences  beneficiary  response  deserve  to  be  noted  and  replicated.
Participant  observation,  in  particular,  can  assist  development  managers  in
gaining  an appreciation  of the  attributes  of the  NGO that  facilitate
sustainable  development.
C.  The  WGO-Government-Bank  Triad
ihe  Bank  primarily  lends  to  governments.  The  involvement  of  NGOs
in  Bank  oparations,  aside  from  policy  dialogue  and  informal  consultations,
comes  with  the  approval  of  borrowing  governments.  The  relationship  between
NMOs  and  governments  in  many  of the  projects  reviewed  (TKV/Turkey,
PRODELs/Zaire,  CARE/Sierra  Lecoa,  Dairy  Coops/India,  Dian  Desa/Indonesia)
moderatad  project  success,  despite  which  most  NGOs  performed  reasonably  well.
The  problems  were  diverse: rivalry  and  jealousy  among  NGOs,  NGO
dissatisfaction  with the  contractor  role,  corruption,  etc.  In  most cases  the
Bank's  influence  on the  situation  was  limited. In  the  present  study,  for
example,  only  one  of the  24  projects  reviewed,  the  Yemen  Arab  Republic  Second
Education  Project,  demonstrated  a  harmonious  mutually  supportive  relationship
among  the  NGO, the  government  and  the  Bank.  Too  often  NGOs,  governments  and
donors  have  come  together  without  a  shared  understanding  of  their  mutual- 80 -
relationshlps  in the  project  context. The linkages  among  NGOs,  Government,
and the  Bank  need  to  be strengthened  in the  interests  of project  effectiveness
and  sustainability.
Reegmmendations:
1.  Provide  institutional  assistance  to  both NGOs  and  governments  to
better  enable  each  to deal  with the  other  for  development  ends. Many  NGOs in
all  five  categories  have institutional  needs--financial,  administrative,
managerial--which  could  be addressed  by specific  forms  of technical  assistance
in accounting,  record  keeping,  monitoring  and  evaluation,  etc. Well-managed
NGOs  in turn  will  be better  able  to  collaborate  with governments.  Similarly,
governments  may  need  assistance  in improving  their  capacity  to  work
effectively  with  NGOs  by,  for  example,  setting  up public  information  or  NGO-
liaison  offices,  and  recruiting  persons  with  NGO experience  for  public
agencies.
2.  Strengthen  Bank-NGO  Dialogue. Effective  involvement  of  NGOs in
relevant  Bank  projects  will  require  seeing  the  NGO  as a  development
institution  in its  own  right. With the  recent  emphasis  given  by Bank  senior
management  on the  incorporation  of  NGOs in  Bank  work,  many  managers  and  staff
have started  to  make  the  operational  and  policy  adaptations  necessary  for
effective  collaboration  with  NGOs  of all  types. The  Bank  is  making  a
concerted  effort  to  draw  on  NGO  expertise  in  crucial  policy  areas  such  as
environmental  impact,  community  initiatives,  developing  country  debt,
microenterprises,  and  structural  adjustment,  among  others. Increasing- 81  -
comiunication  with  NGOs through  the  Bank-NGO Comnittee,  NGO  consortia,  and
meetings  at  the  regional  or  national  level  further  opens  channels  between  the
Bank  and  NGOs worldwide.  In  this  cliuate  of  growing  mutual  interest  in
collaboration,  the  Bank  should  give  serious  consideration  to a  proactive
brokering  role  through  the  sponsorship  of  occasional  conferences  and  workshops
for  the  dissemination  of innovative  NGO  experiences  and  development
perspectives.  As governments,  NGOs,  and  the  Bank  come  to appreciate  their
common  goals  and  distinct  characteristics,  the  foundation  is  being  formed  for
sound  partnerships  and  lasting  development.- 82  -
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CASE STUDY
KEHYA:  INTEGRATED  RURAL  HEALTH  AND  FAMILY  PLANNING  PROJECTS
Over  15  NGOs are  now tied  into  Kenya's  official  efforts  to  provide
information  and  family  planning  services  to control  population  growth. Under
the  auspices  of the  National  Council  for  Population  and  Development  under  the
Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  about  half  of these  organizations  are  the  recipients
of  World  Bank  funds.
In  appraising  Population  II,  Bank  staff  searched  for  ways to
improve  the  performance  of Population  I,  which  had  failed  to stem  a population
growth  rate  increase. Shortcomings  were  identified  as inadequate  commitment
of  Ministry  of Health  officials  to  the  family  planning  program,  heavy
concentration  on the  supply  of services  relative  to activities  stimulating
demand,  and  excessive  reliance  on  Ministry  of Health  for  management  and
implementation.  To integrate  the  community  education  activities  of NGOs,  Bank
staLf  began  to  encourage  discussions  between  several  major  church-related  NGOs
and  MOH.
It  was  decided  that  the  project  would  support  creation  of the
National  Council  for  Population  and  Development  (NCPD),  which  would  coordinate
information  ard  education  activities  to  create  demand  for  family  planning,
thereby  complementing  MOH  service-delivery.  GOK  was  responsive  to the  idea,
realizing  its  own  limitations  in reaching  people  at the  local  level  and
anxious  to  bring  NGO  health  and  family  planning activities  under  one
umbrella. The  five  NGOs  which  had  been involved  in  planning,  plus one  other, 1
were invited  to  be members  of NCPD  and thus  to receive  Bank  funding.
Additional  NGOs  could  participate  as they  developed  workable  proposals.
NGO  activities  include  training  teachers  and  church  leaders  to
teach  farily  life  education  and  family  planning  to  youth,  to train  community
leaders  to  run  workshops,  to instruct  couples  about  Natural  Family  Planning,
to  operate  family  planning  clinics,  and  to  distribute  contraceptives.  Each
organization  continues  to function  on its  own  operating  principles,  reporting
quarterly  to  NCPD.
The  NGOs feel  that  the  NCPD is  their  creation,  especially  since  it
required  much  NGO assistance  in the  early  days. The  government-appointed
director--and  most of the  appointed  staff--had  no background  in family
planning. There  have  been improvements  as staff  turnover  has lessened  and
experience  has increased,  but  NGOs  continue  to express  concern  that  the
1The  NGOs  involved  in  Population  II  are  the  Christian  Health  Association
of Kenya,  Family  Planning  Association  of  Kenya,  Kenya  Catholic  Secretariat,
Naendaleo Ya  Wanawake,  National Council of Churches  of Kenya, and the
Salvation  Army.  In Population  III,  Bank  funding  was  extended  to  support  the
Kenya  National  Teachers  Association  and  the  Kenya  Medical  Association.- 91  -
coordination  functions  are  not  well-developed,  in  particular  the  geographical
delineation  of project  areas. NCPD  tends  to dominate  the  relationship  through
an inflexible,  often  inefficient  budget  process  and  a generally  paternalistic
attitude.
NGO-government  coordinqtion  happens  more often  and  with  better
results  at the  district  and  local  levels,  where  coordination  is informal,
stimulated  by personal  relationships  and  the  need  to share  resources. Local
leaders  serve  on  selection  panels  for  community  family  planning  agents  and  are
often  NGO-trained  themselves.  Some work  to  mobilize  comunity  interest,  often
using  NGO  materials  and  resource  people.  National  officials  are  more
concerned  with  macro  policy  issues  and  delineation  of responsibilities  along
Ministry  lines.
NCO coordination  with  other  NGOs  at the  national  level  is
facilitated  by quarterly  meetings. Local  level  coordination  tends  to  be
unstructured  and  sporad'c.  While  there  is considerable  sharing  of information
and  education  materials,  geographical  delineations  of  activity  are  hit-and-
miss.  This  overlap  is  not  always  a  concern,  however,  as some  NGOs  concentrate
on family  life  education  without  providing  services,  while  others  concentrate
on service-delivery.
Many of the  NGOs  have  experienced  some  organizational  strain  as
they  have  expanded  family  planning  programs  on top  of their  other  activities.
The  volunteer  base on  which  many  of them  depend  is  considered  a continuing
weakness  for  both implementation  and  sustainability.  Maintaining  motivation
in  a  volunteer  agent  is difficult  when there  are  few  resources--both  staff  and
vehicles--to  spare  for  constant  rapervision.  Additionally,  observation  in the
field  revealed  that  volunteers  often  take  on many  more  responsibilities  than
anticipated,  for  example,  counselling  youth  and  parents  not only  on family
planning,  but  also  on  the  social  problems  which  trigger  sexual
irresponsibility.  Community  contraceptive  distributors  may  find  their  rounds
taking  up  to  three  times  longer  than  anticipated.
As the  Population  projects  progress,  more  is learned  about
government-NGO  relationships  and  the  Bank's  role  in  catalyzing  their
development.  The  NCPD  experience  will  provide  a successful  model  of
implementation  within  a trilateral  relationship.- 92  -
CASE STUDY
TOGO:  NCO  COLLABORATIVE  PROJECT
The  Togo  project  is  the  Bank's  first  free-standing  NGO  support
project. Initiated  with a $500,000  Special  Proj,ct  Preparation  Facility
(SPPF)  in  1985,  this  pilot  attempt  to coordinate,  ttain,  and fund  indigenous
NGO.  has  been  much  scrutinized.  The  lessons  learned  during  the  trial  period
contributed  to  a solid  appraisal  of  what is  to  be a  $4  million  Grassroots
Development  Initiative  Project  (GDIP). Ot.her  projects  working  to integrate
NGO  participation  have  also  benefitted  from  this  experience.
The  Bank selected  Togo  for its  pilot  NGO  project  based  on several
initial  perceptions  of the  environment:  1) there  was a  very  vocal  and  active
umbrella  organization,  CONGAT,  which  claimed  to  represent  the  entire  NGO
community,  and  indeed,  had  been chanrielling  funds  for  a number  of  other
donors,  2) the  international  NGO  community  was  active,  3) there  were  a number
of  active  local  NGOs,  and  4) the  Government  appeared  to  take  a  non-
competitive,  cooperative  approach  to  working  with  NGOs.  In fact,  it  had
already  initiated  a Program  for  Participatory  and  Local  Development  (PDLP)  in
which  NGOs  were to  be integrated.
These  perceptions  were  not  borne  out in  several  key respects.
CONGAT  did  not act  as a legitimate  umbrella  organization,  primarily  because  it
had  developed  its  own  service  branch  which  competed  with  member  NGOs for  donor
funding. Many NGOs  resented  CONGAt's  self  interest  and the  dependence  that
resulted  from  CONGAT  control  of funds. These  formed  a separate  federation
(SLONG)  in  opposition  to CONGAT  and  its  outspoken  director. Though  the  two
eventually  joined  to form  FONGTO,  which  now  coordinates  NGO  activities  and
training  programs,  the  COMGi.r  director  continued  tj  create  negative  publicity
about  the  project.
Local  NGOs  proved  to  be relatively  weak.  The first  two  pilot
projects,  for  example,  were  either  unsuccessful  or long-delayed  because  there
had  been llttle  analysis  of the  groups'  institutional  capacities.  However,
though  disheartening  at the  time,  this  knowledge  supported  development  of  a
fund  within  GDIP for  technical  assistance  to  NGOs  requiring  managerial  and
financial  skills  to  be eligible  for  project  funding. Furthermore,  for  GDIP,
Government,  NGOs,  and  the  Bank  have  delineated  specific  eligibility  criteria,
in order  to identify  NGOs in  need  of  prior  technical  assistance  and  cull  out
groups  without  legitimate  claims  to  NGO  status.
While  the  Government  has expressed  support  for  the  project
throughout,  government  and  NGO  representatives  have  had to  put  great  effort
into  creating  a workable  coordinating  mechanism. A number  of the  bureaucratic
obstacles  which  initially  troubled  the  project  have  been  removed. The  PDLP
division,  which  now serves  as secretariat  to  the  Steering  Committee  and- 93 -
maintains  a data  base  of NGO  activities,  was  originally  responsible  for
day-to-day  project  management. Its  lethargic  approach  stimulated  increased
activity  from  the  Steering  Committee,  an advisory  body  composed  of NGO
representatives  and  government  officials,  with the  close  association  of the
Bank's  Resident  Representative.  Thus  the  Steering  Committee  is  now  the
legitimate  coordinating  body  under  GDIP,  reviewing  and  selecting  project
proposals.
In  sumary,  though  the  SPPF was  plagued  with  too  little  analysis
of  institutional  capacity  and  political  context,  and  too  much  international
attention,  sustained  enthusiastic  efforts  on  the  part  of  Government,  Bank  and
NGC.s is  expected  to  lead  to  a successful  and  innovative  project  which  should
offer  worthy  lessons  for  replication  elsewhere.- 94  -
CASE STUDY
GUATEMALA:  EARTHQUAKE  RECONSTRUCTION  PROJECT
FENACOAC  is  a federation  of 69  savings  and  loans  cooperatives,  all
but  one  of  which  are  in  rural  areas  of Guatemala. The federation  received  3.7
million  dollars  from  the  project  to onlend  through  its  member  cooperatives  to
micro-enterprises.  By all  accounts,  FENACOAC  was responsible  for making  this
component  one  of the  more successful  in the  project.
Responsibility  for  micro-enterprise  loan  administrationwas  initially
given  to BANVI,  the  national  housing  bank.  However,  after  two  or three  years,
it  became  apparent  that  BANVI,  accustomed  to  working  with  large  industrial  loarE>,
had little  interest  in  administering  small-enterprise  funds. In searching  tor
an alternative  implementing  institution,  Bank  project  staff  identified  FENTACOAC
as an organization  with  both  knowledge  of local  needs  and  experifnce  in small-
enterprise  support. Bocause  it  was  known  to  be generally unsympathetic  to the
government,  officials  were unenthusiastic  about FENACOAC's  involvement.  Bank
management  felt that the federation's  track record  did not show sufficient
experience.  However,  as there  were few  alternatives,  MENACOAC  was selected.
The program  got  off to a slow  start:  FENACOAC  was conservative  in
its onlending  policies,  primarily  because  it  realized  that the cooperatives
required  managerial  and  technical  assistance  to  prepare  proposals  and  implement
projects. Once  FENACOAC  hired  additional  staff  to work  with its  members,  the
federation  was able  to  disburse  all  funds. More significantly,  there  has  been
an almost  100% recovery  rate from the  entrepreneurs. There are a number  of
factors  which  lay  behind  this  success:
1)  Low  interest  rates.  FENACOAC  borrowed  from  BANVI  at  four  percent  and  loaned
to  its  member  cooperatives  at  9%,  which  onlent  to  the  ultimate  borrowers  at  12%,
4% below  the  prevailing  private  bank  rate.
2)  Little  collateral  requirement. Due to the  frequent  interaction  between
the  cooperatives  and  their  members,  there  was far  less  collateral  required  by
the  cooperative  than  by the  more  distant,  formalistic  private  banks.
3)  Proximity  to the  beneficiaries.  The  network  of coopera'ives  affiliated
with FENACOAC  penetrated  into the  rural  communities  far more than  any of the
private  banks--or  certainly  BANVI  with  its  one  central  office  in  Guatemala;  tty.
To many low income  Guatemalans,  the local cooperative  is the only c:edit
institution  they  know.
The  primary  benefit  of  the  FENACOAC  Credit  Program  was  income  rather
than employment  generation,  not inconsequential  considering  the income  level
reached by  this project.  The  average household income of  the project
beneficiaries  was  $94  per  month,  or  $1130  per  year,  well  below  the  median  income
level  for  the  country. It  appears  that  many  of  the  borrowers  are  self-employed,
one-man  operations;  the average  number  of workers  was reported  to be two to
three,  including  the  owner.- 95  -
CASE STUDY
BOLIVIA:  FIRST  URBAN PGRkADING  PROJECT
The  Bolivia  urban  development  project  included  one  of the  more
successful  Bank-sponsored  slum-upgrading  projects. Much  of this  success  is
due  to the  active  participation  of the  La Paz  community  associations,  whose
leaders  were essential  to the  residents'  involvement  in  planning  and
implementation.
During  appraisal,  Bank  project  staff  identified  the  pre-existing
coramunity  groups  as important  to success,  realizing  that  no  self-helpw  or
cost-recovery  scheme  ahould  be implemented  without  community  approval  and
participation.  A project  implementation  unit (HAM-BIRF)  was  spun  off  of the
La Paz  mayor's  office,  staffed  by several  dynamic  and  competent  individuals
who  worked  as liaison  betwesn  the  Bank/Borrower  and  residents.  It  was  HAM-
BIRF's  responsibility  to  relay  to communities  their  upgrading  options  and  the
costs  of each,  the  amount  of  work and  money  that  residents  would  be expected
to contribute,  work  schedules,  etc.  Since  the  project  required  complete
community  agreement  on upgrading  before  any individual  would  be assis-ed,  HAM-
BIRF  was to ensure  that  communities  were entirely  committed.
The  community  associations  function  essentially  as small  units  of
collective  government,  but they  are  not  functionally  part  of the  La  Paz
municipal  government  (though  sometimes  they  may  be politically  affiliated  with
municipal  officials).  They  served  as agitators  for  services  years  before  the
government  requested  Bank  assistance.
The  political  context  of the  project  changed  several  times  during
the  course  of implementation.  Government  cooperation  tended  to  ebb  and  flow
with the  priorities  of  oft-changing  officials.  Political  maneuverings  during
one  election  set  the  project  back  almost  three  years.  Politicians  played
communities  against  one  another  and  against  HAM-BIRF  to  curry  constituent
support. Communities  not  scheduled  for  upgrading  were told  of  what  other
neighborhoods  were  to receive  and  promised  similar  opportunities,  and
communities  which  had already  agreed  to  repayment  plans  were told  that  they
were entitled  to these  services,  which  they  would  receive  free  if  a certain
candidate  were elected. This turn  of  events  was  damaging  to  the  project,
especially  since  most communities  were  very  close  to  signing  the  final
contract  and  beginning  implementation.
As it  became  apparent  that  promised  services  were  not going  to
materialize,  a  community  leader  with foresight  mobilized  his  community  to
agree  to the  project's  terms. More  and  more  communities  signed  on as
residents  saw  visual  proof  of the  potential  benefits.
The  primary  problems,  identified  during  a  beneficiary  assessment,
cGintered  on an insufficient  information  flow  between  project  staff  and
,esidents. For  example,  service  installment  was  often  delayed  for  reasons
beyond  the  control  of HAM-BIRF,  yet  because  residents  were  not  informed,  they- 96 -
tenied  to  blame  the  project. Additionally,  residents  felt  dissatisfied
because  certain  things  had  not  been  accomplished,  though  these  things  had  not
been  part of the  agreements  in the  first  place--a  fact  which  should  have  been
clarified  to the  communities.  Another  problem  was  lack  of artention  to
rentars,  many  of whom,  being  relatively  invisible  and lacking  in  political
clout,  had their  situations  worsened  by the  upgrading.
Overall,  the  community  association  participation  component  of this
project  was  particularly  successful:  residents  worked  to improve  their  homes,
pave/lay  gravel  on streets,  install  water  supplies  and  toilets,  and  make  other
improvements.  Their  neighborhoods  are  now considered  part  of the  city  proper.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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